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SubjectRe: [PATCH 05/25] x86/sgx: Introduce runtime protection bits
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On 12/3/21 14:12, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> Hi Andy,
>
> On 12/3/2021 11:28 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On 12/1/21 11:23, Reinette Chatre wrote:
>>> Enclave creators declare their paging permission intent at the time
>>> the pages are added to the enclave. These paging permissions are
>>> vetted when pages are added to the enclave and stashed off
>>> (in sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits) for later comparison with
>>> enclave PTEs.
>>>
>>
>> I'm a bit confused here. ENCLU[EMODPE] allows the enclave to change
>> the EPCM permission bits however it likes with no oversight from the
>> kernel.   So we end up with a whole bunch of permission masks:
>
> Before jumping to the permission masks I would like to step back and
> just confirm the context. We need to consider the following three
> permissions:
>
> EPCM permissions: the enclave page permissions maintained in the SGX
> hardware. The OS is constrained here in that it cannot query the current
> EPCM permissions. Even so, the OS needs to ensure PTEs are installed
> appropriately (we do not want a RW PTE for a read-only enclave page)

Why not? What's wrong with an RW PTE for a read-only enclave page?

If you convince me that this is actually important, then I'll read all
the stuff below.

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