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SubjectRe: [PATCH 10/25] x86/sgx: Support enclave page permission changes
On 12/1/21 11:23, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> In the initial (SGX1) version of SGX, pages in an enclave need to be
> created with permissions that support all usages of the pages, from the
> time the enclave is initialized until it is unloaded. For example,
> pages used by a JIT compiler or when code needs to otherwise be
> relocated need to always have RWX permissions.
> SGX2 includes two functions that can be used to modify the enclave page
> permissions of regular enclave pages within an initialized enclave.
> ENCLS[EMODPR] is run from the OS and used to restrict enclave page
> permissions while ENCLU[EMODPE] is run from within the enclave to
> extend enclave page permissions.
> Enclave page permission changes need to be approached with care and
> for this reason this initial support is to allow enclave page
> permission changes _only_ if the new permissions are the same or
> more restrictive that the permissions originally vetted at the time the
> pages were added to the enclave. Support for extending enclave page
> permissions beyond what was originally vetted is deferred.

I may well be missing something, but off the top of my head, literally
the only reason that EMODPR needs CPL0 (i.e. ENCLS) is that it requires
a TLB flush IPI to take effect. (Score one for AMD for being having
superior hardware in this regard.)

Given that, I don't see any reason for the EMODPR operation to be
treated as security sensitive -- it just needs to be implemented
correctly. I don't even see why the host should (or even can!) do any
useful tracking of the EPCM state.

(But I am confused about one thing: to the extent an enclave actually
needs EMODPR, is there anything in the hardware or anything that the
enclave can do short of actually poking the page from all threads and
confirming that a fault occurs to make sure the OS actually flushed the
TLB? ISTM a malicious host could attack an enclave by omitting the TLB
flush and then exploiting an enclave but that would have been mitigated
if the flush occurred.)


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