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Subject[PATCH v6] random: fix crash on multiple early calls to add_bootloader_randomness()
Currently, if CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is enabled, multiple calls
to add_bootloader_randomness() are broken and can cause a NULL pointer
dereference, as noted by Ivan T. Ivanov. This is not only a hypothetical
problem, as qemu on arm64 may provide bootloader entropy via EFI and via

On the first call to add_hwgenerator_randomness(), crng_fast_load() is
executed, and if the seed is long enough, crng_init will be set to 1.
On subsequent calls to add_bootloader_randomness() and then to
add_hwgenerator_randomness(), crng_fast_load() will be skipped. Instead,
wait_event_interruptible() and then credit_entropy_bits() will be called.
If the entropy count for that second seed is large enough, that proceeds
to crng_reseed().

However, both wait_event_interruptible() and crng_reseed() depends
(at least in numa_crng_init()) on workqueues. Therefore, test whether
system_wq is already initialized, which is a sufficient indicator that
workqueue_init_early() has progressed far enough.

Reported-by: Ivan T. Ivanov <>
Fixes: 18b915ac6b0a ("efi/random: Treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness")
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <>


drivers/char/random.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)


This is now a truly minimalist approach which tests for system_wq != NULL,
as suggested by Jason.

Another issue remains, though, but should be addressed separately: If one
trusts the randnomness provided by the bootloader, and if the primary_crng
is then seeded with 512 bits of entropy, warnings will still be emited that
unseeded randomness is used with crng_init=1.

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 13c968b950c5..3c44f5ff6cc4 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -993,7 +993,10 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
- if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
+ /* Only finalize initialization if workqueues are ready; otherwise
+ * numa_crng_init() and other things may go wrong.
+ */
+ if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2 && system_wq) {
crng_init = 2;
@@ -2299,7 +2302,8 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
* We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh,
* or when the calling thread is about to terminate.
- wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, kthread_should_stop() ||
+ wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait,
+ !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() ||
ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits);
mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count);
credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy);
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