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SubjectRe: [PATCH v4 1/3] efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area
On Wed, Oct 20, 2021 at 03:52:49PM +0300, Dov Murik wrote:
>
>
> On 20/10/2021 15:11, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Wed, Oct 20, 2021 at 08:00:28AM -0400, James Bottomley wrote:
> >> On Wed, 2021-10-20 at 08:39 +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Oct 20, 2021 at 06:14:06AM +0000, Dov Murik wrote:
> >> [...]
> >>>> + help
> >>>> + Copy memory reserved by EFI for Confidential Computing (coco)
> >>>> + injected secrets, if EFI exposes such a table entry.
> >>>
> >>> Why would you want to "copy" secret memory?
> >>>
> >>> This sounds really odd here, it sounds like you are opening up a
> >>> security hole. Are you sure this is the correct text that everyone
> >>> on the "COCO" group agrees with?
> >>
> >> The way this works is that EFI covers the secret area with a boot time
> >> handoff block, which means it gets destroyed as soon as
> >> ExitBootServices is called as a security measure ... if you do nothing
> >> the secret is shredded. This means you need to make a copy of it
> >> before that happens if there are secrets that need to live beyond the
> >> EFI boot stub.
> >
> > Ok, but "copy secrets" does sound really odd, so you all need a much
> > better description here, and hopefully somewhere else in Documentation/
> > to describe exactly what this new API is and is to be used for.
> >
>
>
> So something like:
>
>
> config EFI_COCO_SECRET
> bool "Keep the EFI Confidential Computing secret area"
> depends on EFI
> help
> Confidential Computing platforms (such as AMD SEV) allow for
> secrets injection during guest VM launch. The secrets are
> placed in a designated EFI memory area. EFI destorys
> the confidential computing secret area when ExitBootServices
> is called.

That last sentence does not make much sense to me, sorry.

> In order to use the secrets in the kernel, the secret area
> must be copied to kernel-reserved memory (before it is erased).
>
> If you say Y here, the EFI stub will copy the EFI secret area (if
> available) and reserve it for use inside the kernel. This will
> allow the virt/coco/efi_secret module to access the secrets.

Really this is about getting that data out to userspace, right? Should
you mention that here?

> and some new file like Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst which
> describes this whole protocol (from secret injection at VM launch
> into an EFI page, through efistub and efi in linux, to the efi_secret
> module which exposes the secrets).

Yes, that would be good to have documented.

thanks,

greg k-h

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