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Subject[PATCH v4 3/3] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
Date
The new efi_secret module exposes the confidential computing (coco)
EFI secret area via securityfs interface.

When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under
/sys/kernel/security), a "coco/efi_secret" directory is created in
securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name
of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is
the secret data.

This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to
read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection
mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command).

Removing (unlinking) files in the "coco/efi_secret" directory will zero
out the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the
module is removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the
filesystem.

Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
---
.../ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret | 50 +++
drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 +
drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 11 +
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 +
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 326 ++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 393 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret
create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig
create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile
create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret b/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ae56976db1bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+What: security/coco/efi_secret
+Date: October 2021
+Contact: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
+Description:
+ Exposes confidential computing (coco) EFI secrets to
+ userspace via securityfs.
+
+ EFI can declare memory area used by confidential computing
+ platforms (such as AMD SEV and SEV-ES) for secret injection by
+ the Guest Owner during VM's launch. The secrets are encrypted
+ by the Guest Owner and decrypted inside the trusted enclave,
+ and therefore are not readable by the untrusted host.
+
+ The efi_secret module exposes the secrets to userspace. Each
+ secret appears as a file under <securityfs>/coco/efi_secret,
+ where the filename is the GUID of the entry in the secrets
+ table.
+
+ Two operations are supported for the files: read and unlink.
+ Reading the file returns the content of secret entry.
+ Unlinking the file overwrites the secret data with zeroes and
+ removes the entry from the filesystem. A secret cannot be read
+ after it has been unlinked.
+
+ For example, listing the available secrets::
+
+ # modprobe efi_secret
+ # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret
+ -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
+ -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
+ -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
+ -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
+
+ Reading the secret data by reading a file::
+
+ # cat /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
+ the-content-of-the-secret-data
+
+ Wiping a secret by unlinking a file::
+
+ # rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
+ # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret
+ -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
+ -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
+ -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
+
+ Note: The binary format of the secrets table injected by the
+ Guest Owner is described in
+ drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c under "Structure of
+ the EFI secret area".
diff --git a/drivers/virt/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/Kconfig
index 8061e8ef449f..fe7a6579b974 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/virt/Kconfig
@@ -36,4 +36,7 @@ source "drivers/virt/vboxguest/Kconfig"
source "drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves/Kconfig"

source "drivers/virt/acrn/Kconfig"
+
+source "drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig"
+
endif
diff --git a/drivers/virt/Makefile b/drivers/virt/Makefile
index 3e272ea60cd9..efdb015783f9 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/virt/Makefile
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y += vboxguest/

obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES) += nitro_enclaves/
obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_HSM) += acrn/
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += coco/efi_secret/
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a39a5a90a1e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+config EFI_SECRET
+ tristate "EFI secret area securityfs support"
+ depends on EFI
+ select EFI_COCO_SECRET
+ select SECURITYFS
+ help
+ This is a driver for accessing the EFI secret area via securityfs.
+
+ To compile this driver as a module, choose M here.
+ The module will be called efi_secret.
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c7047ce804f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += efi_secret.o
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9128623b5e4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * efi_secret module
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+/**
+ * DOC: efi_secret: Allow reading EFI confidential computing (coco) secret area
+ * via securityfs interface.
+ *
+ * When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under
+ * /sys/kernel/security), a "coco/efi_secret" directory is created in
+ * securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of
+ * each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the
+ * secret data.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+
+#define EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES 64
+
+#define EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID \
+ EFI_GUID(0x1e74f542, 0x71dd, 0x4d66, 0x96, 0x3e, 0xef, 0x42, 0x87, 0xff, 0x17, 0x3b)
+
+struct efi_secret {
+ struct dentry *coco_dir;
+ struct dentry *fs_dir;
+ struct dentry *fs_files[EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES];
+ struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area *secret_area;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Structure of the EFI secret area
+ *
+ * Offset Length
+ * (bytes) (bytes) Usage
+ * ------- ------- -----
+ * 0 16 Secret table header GUID (must be 1e74f542-71dd-4d66-963e-ef4287ff173b)
+ * 16 4 Length of bytes of the entire secret area
+ *
+ * 20 16 First secret entry's GUID
+ * 36 4 First secret entry's length in bytes (= 16 + 4 + x)
+ * 40 x First secret entry's data
+ *
+ * 40+x 16 Second secret entry's GUID
+ * 56+x 4 Second secret entry's length in bytes (= 16 + 4 + y)
+ * 60+x y Second secret entry's data
+ *
+ * (... and so on for additional entries)
+ *
+ * The GUID of each secret entry designates the usage of the secret data.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * struct secret_header - Header of entire secret area; this should be followed
+ * by instances of struct secret_entry.
+ * @guid: Must be EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID
+ * @len: Length in bytes of entire secret area, including header
+ */
+struct secret_header {
+ efi_guid_t guid;
+ u32 len;
+} __attribute((packed));
+
+/**
+ * struct secret_entry - Holds one secret entry
+ * @guid: Secret-specific GUID (or NULL_GUID if this secret entry was deleted)
+ * @len: Length of secret entry, including its guid and len fields
+ * @data: The secret data (full of zeros if this secret entry was deleted)
+ */
+struct secret_entry {
+ efi_guid_t guid;
+ u32 len;
+ u8 data[];
+} __attribute((packed));
+
+static size_t secret_entry_data_len(struct secret_entry *e)
+{
+ return e->len - sizeof(*e);
+}
+
+static struct efi_secret the_efi_secret;
+
+static inline struct efi_secret *efi_secret_get(void)
+{
+ return &the_efi_secret;
+}
+
+static int efi_secret_bin_file_show(struct seq_file *file, void *data)
+{
+ struct secret_entry *e = file->private;
+
+ if (e)
+ seq_write(file, e->data, secret_entry_data_len(e));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(efi_secret_bin_file);
+
+/*
+ * Overwrite memory content with zeroes, and ensure that dirty cache lines are
+ * actually written back to memory, to clear out the secret.
+ */
+static void wipe_memory(void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+ memzero_explicit(addr, size);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ clflush_cache_range(addr, size);
+#endif
+}
+
+static int efi_secret_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ struct secret_entry *e = (struct secret_entry *)inode->i_private;
+ int i;
+
+ if (e) {
+ /* Zero out the secret data */
+ wipe_memory(e->data, secret_entry_data_len(e));
+ e->guid = NULL_GUID;
+ }
+
+ inode->i_private = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES; i++)
+ if (s->fs_files[i] == dentry)
+ s->fs_files[i] = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * securityfs_remove tries to lock the directory's inode, but we reach
+ * the unlink callback when it's already locked
+ */
+ inode_unlock(dir);
+ securityfs_remove(dentry);
+ inode_lock(dir);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations efi_secret_dir_inode_operations = {
+ .lookup = simple_lookup,
+ .unlink = efi_secret_unlink,
+};
+
+static int efi_secret_map_area(void)
+{
+ struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+ struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area *secret_area;
+ u32 secret_area_size;
+
+ if (efi.coco_secret == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
+ pr_err("Secret area address is not available\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ secret_area = memremap(efi.coco_secret, sizeof(*secret_area), MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (secret_area == NULL) {
+ pr_err("Could not map secret area header\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ secret_area_size = sizeof(*secret_area) + secret_area->size;
+ memunmap(secret_area);
+
+ secret_area = memremap(efi.coco_secret, secret_area_size, MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (secret_area == NULL) {
+ pr_err("Could not map secret area\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ s->secret_area = secret_area;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void efi_secret_securityfs_teardown(void)
+{
+ struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = (EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES - 1); i >= 0; i--) {
+ securityfs_remove(s->fs_files[i]);
+ s->fs_files[i] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ securityfs_remove(s->fs_dir);
+ s->fs_dir = NULL;
+
+ securityfs_remove(s->coco_dir);
+ s->coco_dir = NULL;
+
+ pr_debug("Removed efi_secret securityfs entries\n");
+}
+
+static int efi_secret_securityfs_setup(void)
+{
+ efi_guid_t tableheader_guid = EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID;
+ struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+ int ret = 0, i = 0, bytes_left;
+ unsigned char *ptr;
+ struct secret_header *h;
+ struct secret_entry *e;
+ struct dentry *dent;
+ char guid_str[EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN + 1];
+
+ s->coco_dir = NULL;
+ s->fs_dir = NULL;
+ memset(s->fs_files, 0, sizeof(s->fs_files));
+
+ dent = securityfs_create_dir("coco", NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
+ pr_err("Error creating coco securityfs directory entry err=%ld\n", PTR_ERR(dent));
+ return PTR_ERR(dent);
+ }
+ s->coco_dir = dent;
+
+ dent = securityfs_create_dir("efi_secret", s->coco_dir);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
+ pr_err("Error creating efi_secret securityfs directory entry err=%ld\n",
+ PTR_ERR(dent));
+ return PTR_ERR(dent);
+ }
+ d_inode(dent)->i_op = &efi_secret_dir_inode_operations;
+ s->fs_dir = dent;
+
+ ptr = s->secret_area->area;
+ h = (struct secret_header *)ptr;
+ if (memcmp(&h->guid, &tableheader_guid, sizeof(h->guid))) {
+ pr_err("EFI secret area does not start with correct GUID\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_cleanup;
+ }
+ if (h->len < sizeof(*h)) {
+ pr_err("EFI secret area reported length is too small\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ bytes_left = h->len - sizeof(*h);
+ ptr += sizeof(*h);
+ while (bytes_left >= (int)sizeof(*e) && i < EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES) {
+ e = (struct secret_entry *)ptr;
+ if (e->len < sizeof(*e) || e->len > (unsigned int)bytes_left) {
+ pr_err("EFI secret area is corrupted\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip deleted entries (which will have NULL_GUID) */
+ if (efi_guidcmp(e->guid, NULL_GUID)) {
+ efi_guid_to_str(&e->guid, guid_str);
+
+ dent = securityfs_create_file(guid_str, 0440, s->fs_dir, (void *)e,
+ &efi_secret_bin_file_fops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
+ pr_err("Error creating efi_secret securityfs entry\n");
+ ret = PTR_ERR(dent);
+ goto err_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ s->fs_files[i++] = dent;
+ }
+ ptr += e->len;
+ bytes_left -= e->len;
+ }
+
+ pr_debug("Created %d entries in efi_secret securityfs\n", i);
+ return 0;
+
+err_cleanup:
+ efi_secret_securityfs_teardown();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void efi_secret_unmap_area(void)
+{
+ struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
+
+ if (s->secret_area) {
+ memunmap(s->secret_area);
+ s->secret_area = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int __init efi_secret_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = efi_secret_map_area();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = efi_secret_securityfs_setup();
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_unmap;
+
+ return ret;
+
+err_unmap:
+ efi_secret_unmap_area();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit efi_secret_exit(void)
+{
+ efi_secret_securityfs_teardown();
+ efi_secret_unmap_area();
+}
+
+module_init(efi_secret_init);
+module_exit(efi_secret_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Confidential computing EFI secret area access");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
--
2.25.1
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