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SubjectRe: [patch 1/2] x86,module: Detect VMX modules and disable Split-Lock-Detect

> On Apr 3, 2020, at 11:54 AM, Thomas Gleixner <> wrote:
> Peter Zijlstra <> writes:
>>> On Fri, Apr 03, 2020 at 04:35:00PM +0200, Jessica Yu wrote:
>>> +++ Rasmus Villemoes [03/04/20 01:42 +0200]:
>>>> On 02/04/2020 14.32, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>>>>> From: Peter Zijlstra <>
>>>>> It turns out that with Split-Lock-Detect enabled (default) any VMX
>>>>> hypervisor needs at least a little modification in order to not blindly
>>>>> inject the #AC into the guest without the guest being ready for it.
>>>>> Since there is no telling which module implements a hypervisor, scan the
>>>>> module text and look for the VMLAUNCH instruction. If found, the module is
>>>>> assumed to be a hypervisor of some sort and SLD is disabled.
>>>> How long does that scan take/add to module load time? Would it make
>>>> sense to exempt in-tree modules?
>>>> Rasmus
>>> I second Rasmus's question. It seems rather unfortunate that we have
>>> to do this text scan for every module load on x86, when it doesn't
>>> apply to the majority of them, and only to a handful of out-of-tree
>>> hypervisor modules (assuming kvm is taken care of already).
>>> I wonder if it would make sense then to limit the text scans to just
>>> out-of-tree modules (i.e., missing the intree modinfo flag)?
>> It would; didn't know there was one.
> But that still would not make it complete.
> I was staring at virtualbox today after Jann pointed out that this
> sucker does complete backwards things.
> The kernel driver does not contain any VM* instructions at all.
> The actual hypervisor code is built as a separate binary and somehow
> loaded into the kernel with their own magic fixup of relocations and
> function linking. This "design" probably comes from the original
> virtualbox implementation which circumvented GPL that way.
> TBH, I don't care if we wreckage virtualbox simply because that thing is
> already a complete and utter trainwreck violating taste and common sense
> in any possible way. Just for illustration:
> - It installs preempt notifiers and the first thing in the callback
> function is to issue 'stac()'!
> - There is quite some other horrible code in there which fiddles in
> the guts of the kernel just because it can.
> - Conditionals in release code which check stuff like
> VBOX_WITH_NON_PROD_HACK_FOR_PERF_STACKS along with the most absurd
> hacks ever.
> If you feel the need to look yourself, please use your eyecancer
> protection gear.
> Can someone at Oracle please make sure, that this monstrosity gets shred
> in pieces?
> Enough vented, but that still does not solve the SLD problem in any
> sensible way.

Could we unexport set_memory_x perhaps? And maybe try to make virtualbox break in as many ways as possible?

> Thanks,
> tglx

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