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SubjectRe: [PATCH v12 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)
On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 07:14:42PM -0700, Sami Tolvanen wrote:
> This change adds generic support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack,
> which uses a shadow stack to protect return addresses from being
> overwritten by an attacker. Details are available here:
>
> https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html
>
> Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the
> ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses
> of shadow stacks used by other tasks and interrupt handlers in
> memory, which means an attacker capable reading and writing
> arbitrary memory may be able to locate them and hijack control
> flow by modifying shadow stacks that are not currently in use.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
> ---
> Makefile | 6 +++
> arch/Kconfig | 25 +++++++++
> include/linux/compiler-clang.h | 6 +++
> include/linux/compiler_types.h | 4 ++
> include/linux/scs.h | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> init/init_task.c | 8 +++
> kernel/Makefile | 1 +
> kernel/fork.c | 9 ++++
> kernel/sched/core.c | 2 +
> kernel/scs.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 10 files changed, 220 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 include/linux/scs.h
> create mode 100644 kernel/scs.c
>
> diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
> index 49b2709ff44e..6094db2c7252 100644
> --- a/Makefile
> +++ b/Makefile
> @@ -866,6 +866,12 @@ ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH
> KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -flive-patching=inline-clone)
> endif
>
> +ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> +CC_FLAGS_SCS := -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack
> +KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(CC_FLAGS_SCS)
> +export CC_FLAGS_SCS
> +endif
> +
> # arch Makefile may override CC so keep this after arch Makefile is included
> NOSTDINC_FLAGS += -nostdinc -isystem $(shell $(CC) -print-file-name=include)
>
> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
> index 786a85d4ad40..8450d56e6af6 100644
> --- a/arch/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/Kconfig
> @@ -533,6 +533,31 @@ config STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
> about 20% of all kernel functions, which increases the kernel code
> size by about 2%.
>
> +config ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> + bool
> + help
> + An architecture should select this if it supports Clang's Shadow
> + Call Stack, has asm/scs.h, and implements runtime support for shadow
> + stack switching.
> +
> +config SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> + bool "Clang Shadow Call Stack"
> + depends on CC_IS_CLANG && ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> + help
> + This option enables Clang's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a
> + shadow stack to protect function return addresses from being
> + overwritten by an attacker. More information can be found in
> + Clang's documentation:
> +
> + https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html
> +
> + Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones
> + documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of shadow
> + stacks used by other tasks and interrupt handlers in memory, which
> + means an attacker capable of reading and writing arbitrary memory
> + may be able to locate them and hijack control flow by modifying
> + shadow stacks that are not currently in use.
> +
> config HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
> bool
> help
> diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-clang.h b/include/linux/compiler-clang.h
> index 333a6695a918..18fc4d29ef27 100644
> --- a/include/linux/compiler-clang.h
> +++ b/include/linux/compiler-clang.h
> @@ -42,3 +42,9 @@
> * compilers, like ICC.
> */
> #define barrier() __asm__ __volatile__("" : : : "memory")
> +
> +#if __has_feature(shadow_call_stack)
> +# define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack")))
> +#else
> +# define __noscs
> +#endif
> diff --git a/include/linux/compiler_types.h b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
> index e970f97a7fcb..97b62f47a80d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/compiler_types.h
> +++ b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
> @@ -193,6 +193,10 @@ struct ftrace_likely_data {
> # define randomized_struct_fields_end
> #endif
>
> +#ifndef __noscs
> +# define __noscs
> +#endif
> +
> #ifndef asm_volatile_goto
> #define asm_volatile_goto(x...) asm goto(x)
> #endif
> diff --git a/include/linux/scs.h b/include/linux/scs.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..051d27ad3da4
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/linux/scs.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +/*
> + * Shadow Call Stack support.
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2019 Google LLC
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _LINUX_SCS_H
> +#define _LINUX_SCS_H
> +
> +#include <linux/gfp.h>
> +#include <linux/poison.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <asm/page.h>
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> +
> +/*
> + * In testing, 1 KiB shadow stack size (i.e. 128 stack frames on a 64-bit
> + * architecture) provided ~40% safety margin on stack usage while keeping
> + * memory allocation overhead reasonable.
> + */
> +#define SCS_SIZE 1024UL
> +#define GFP_SCS (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO)
> +
> +/* An illegal pointer value to mark the end of the shadow stack. */
> +#define SCS_END_MAGIC (0x5f6UL + POISON_POINTER_DELTA)
> +
> +#define task_scs(tsk) (task_thread_info(tsk)->shadow_call_stack)
> +
> +static inline void task_set_scs(struct task_struct *tsk, void *s)
> +{
> + task_scs(tsk) = s;
> +}
> +
> +extern void scs_init(void);
> +
> +static inline void *__scs_base(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + /*
> + * To minimize the risk of exposure, architectures may clear a
> + * task's thread_info::shadow_call_stack while that task is
> + * running, and only save/restore the active shadow call stack
> + * pointer when the usual register may be clobbered (e.g. across
> + * context switches).
> + *
> + * The shadow call stack is aligned to SCS_SIZE, and grows
> + * upwards, so we can mask out the low bits to extract the base
> + * when the task is not running.
> + */
> + return (void *)((unsigned long)task_scs(tsk) & ~(SCS_SIZE - 1));
> +}
> +
> +static inline void scs_task_reset(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Reset the shadow stack to the base address in case the task
> + * is reused.
> + */
> + task_set_scs(tsk, __scs_base(tsk));
> +}
> +
> +extern int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node);
> +
> +static inline unsigned long *__scs_magic(void *s)
> +{
> + return (unsigned long *)(s + SCS_SIZE) - 1;
> +}
> +
> +static inline bool scs_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + unsigned long *magic = __scs_magic(__scs_base(tsk));
> +
> + return READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*magic) != SCS_END_MAGIC;
> +}
> +
> +extern void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk);
> +
> +#else /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
> +
> +#define task_scs(tsk) NULL
> +
> +static inline void task_set_scs(struct task_struct *tsk, void *s) {}
> +static inline void scs_init(void) {}
> +static inline void scs_task_reset(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
> +static inline int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node) { return 0; }
> +static inline bool scs_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; }
> +static inline void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
> +
> +#endif /* _LINUX_SCS_H */
> diff --git a/init/init_task.c b/init/init_task.c
> index bd403ed3e418..aaa71366d162 100644
> --- a/init/init_task.c
> +++ b/init/init_task.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
> #include <linux/mm.h>
> #include <linux/audit.h>
> #include <linux/numa.h>
> +#include <linux/scs.h>
>
> #include <asm/pgtable.h>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> @@ -185,6 +186,13 @@ struct task_struct init_task
> };
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_task);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
> +unsigned long init_shadow_call_stack[SCS_SIZE / sizeof(long)] __init_task_data
> + __aligned(SCS_SIZE) = {
> + [(SCS_SIZE / sizeof(long)) - 1] = SCS_END_MAGIC
> +};
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Initial thread structure. Alignment of this is handled by a special
> * linker map entry.
> diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
> index 4cb4130ced32..c332eb9d4841 100644
> --- a/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS) += trace/
> obj-$(CONFIG_IRQ_WORK) += irq_work.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_PM) += cpu_pm.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_BPF) += bpf/
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK) += scs.o
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += events/
>
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index 8c700f881d92..f6339f9d232d 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
> #include <linux/thread_info.h>
> #include <linux/stackleak.h>
> #include <linux/kasan.h>
> +#include <linux/scs.h>
>
> #include <asm/pgtable.h>
> #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
> @@ -456,6 +457,8 @@ void put_task_stack(struct task_struct *tsk)
>
> void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
> {
> + scs_release(tsk);
> +
> #ifndef CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
> /*
> * The task is finally done with both the stack and thread_info,
> @@ -840,6 +843,8 @@ void __init fork_init(void)
> NULL, free_vm_stack_cache);
> #endif
>
> + scs_init();
> +
> lockdep_init_task(&init_task);
> uprobes_init();
> }
> @@ -899,6 +904,10 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
> if (err)
> goto free_stack;
>
> + err = scs_prepare(tsk, node);
> + if (err)
> + goto free_stack;
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
> /*
> * We must handle setting up seccomp filters once we're under
> diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
> index 3a61a3b8eaa9..c99620c1ec20 100644
> --- a/kernel/sched/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
> #include <linux/nospec.h>
>
> #include <linux/kcov.h>
> +#include <linux/scs.h>
>
> #include <asm/switch_to.h>
> #include <asm/tlb.h>
> @@ -6045,6 +6046,7 @@ void init_idle(struct task_struct *idle, int cpu)
> idle->se.exec_start = sched_clock();
> idle->flags |= PF_IDLE;
>
> + scs_task_reset(idle);
> kasan_unpoison_task_stack(idle);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
> diff --git a/kernel/scs.c b/kernel/scs.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..e1a8fc453b86
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/kernel/scs.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Shadow Call Stack support.
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2019 Google LLC
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/kasan.h>
> +#include <linux/scs.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <asm/scs.h>
> +
> +static struct kmem_cache *scs_cache;
> +
> +static void *scs_alloc(int node)
> +{
> + void *s;
> +
> + s = kmem_cache_alloc_node(scs_cache, GFP_SCS, node);
> + if (s) {
> + *__scs_magic(s) = SCS_END_MAGIC;
> + /*
> + * Poison the allocation to catch unintentional accesses to
> + * the shadow stack when KASAN is enabled.
> + */
> + kasan_poison_object_data(scs_cache, s);
> + }
> +
> + return s;
> +}
> +
> +static void scs_free(void *s)
> +{
> + kasan_unpoison_object_data(scs_cache, s);
> + kmem_cache_free(scs_cache, s);
> +}
> +
> +void __init scs_init(void)
> +{
> + scs_cache = kmem_cache_create("scs_cache", SCS_SIZE, SCS_SIZE,
> + 0, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
> +{
> + void *s;
> +
> + s = scs_alloc(node);
> + if (!s)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + task_set_scs(tsk, s);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + void *s;
> +
> + s = __scs_base(tsk);
> + if (!s)
> + return;
> +
> + WARN_ON(scs_corrupted(tsk));
> +

I'd like to have task_set_scs(tsk, NULL) retained here, to avoid need to
depend on the released task memory getting scrubbed at a later time.
Exposures of this pointer would expose the region of other SCSs.

-Kees

> + scs_free(s);
> +}
> --
> 2.26.1.301.g55bc3eb7cb9-goog
>

--
Kees Cook

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