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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH v2 3/4] arch/x86: Optionally flush L1D on context switch
Date
Balbir Singh <sblbir@amazon.com> writes:

> This patch implements a mechanisn to selectively flush the L1D cache.

git grep 'This patch' Documentation/process/

> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
> index 6f66d841262d..1d535059b358 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
> @@ -219,6 +219,12 @@ struct tlb_state {
> */
> unsigned long cr4;
>
> + /*
> + * Flush the L1D cache on switch_mm_irqs_off() for a
> + * task getting off the CPU, if it opted in to do so
> + */
> + bool last_user_mm_l1d_flush;

...

> +/*
> + * Flush the L1D cache for this CPU. We want to this at switch mm time,
> + * this is a pessimistic security measure and an opt-in for those tasks
> + * that host sensitive information and there are concerns about spills
> + * from fill buffers.

Color me confused, but how is L1D flush mitigating fill buffer spills
(MFBDS)? The MDS family is mitigated by MD_CLEAR, i.e VERW.

> + */
> +static void l1d_flush(struct mm_struct *next, struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + struct mm_struct *real_prev = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
> +
> + /*
> + * If we are not really switching mm's, we can just return
> + */
> + if (real_prev == next)
> + return;

Instead of having the same check here, please stick the call into the
corresponding path in switch_mm_irqs_off(), i.e. where we already have
the cond_ibpb() invocation.

> + /*
> + * Do we need flushing for by the previous task

for by? Perhaps:

Did the previous task request L1D flush when it scheduled in?

> + */
> + if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_l1d_flush) != 0) {

This is a bool, so != 0 is pointless.

> + if (!flush_l1d_cache_hw())
> + flush_l1d_cache_sw(l1d_flush_pages);
> + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_l1d_flush, 0);

s/0/false/

> + /* Make sure we clear the values before we set it again */
> + barrier();
> + }
> +
> + if (tsk == NULL)
> + return;
> +
> + /* We don't need stringent checks as we opt-in/opt-out */
> + if (test_ti_thread_flag(&tsk->thread_info, TIF_L1D_FLUSH))
> + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_l1d_flush, 1);

s/1/true/

That aside looking at the gazillion of conditionals here. That's 4 in
the worst case. So how about extending cond_ibpb() like the below?

Thanks,

tglx

8<---------------------

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct thread_info {
#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing active */
#define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* secure computing */
#define TIF_SPEC_IB 9 /* Indirect branch speculation mitigation */
-#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE 10 /* Force speculation MSR update in context switch */
+#define TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D 10 /* L1D Flush in switch_mm() */
#define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY 11 /* notify kernel of userspace return */
#define TIF_UPROBE 12 /* breakpointed or singlestepping */
#define TIF_PATCH_PENDING 13 /* pending live patching update */
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ struct thread_info {
#define TIF_MEMDIE 20 /* is terminating due to OOM killer */
#define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG 21 /* idle is polling for TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
#define TIF_IO_BITMAP 22 /* uses I/O bitmap */
+#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE 23 /* Force speculation MSR update in context switch */
#define TIF_FORCED_TF 24 /* true if TF in eflags artificially */
#define TIF_BLOCKSTEP 25 /* set when we want DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF */
#define TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES 27 /* task is updating the mmu lazily */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ struct tlb_state {
/* Last user mm for optimizing IBPB */
union {
struct mm_struct *last_user_mm;
- unsigned long last_user_mm_ibpb;
+ unsigned long last_user_mm_spec;
};

u16 loaded_mm_asid;
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -33,10 +33,13 @@
*/

/*
- * Use bit 0 to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB state into the mm pointer which is
- * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_ibpb.
+ * Bits mangle the TIF_SPEC_* state into the mm pointer which is
+ * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_spec.
*/
#define LAST_USER_MM_IBPB 0x1UL
+#define LAST_USER_MM_FLUSH_L1D 0x2UL
+
+#define LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK (LAST_USER_MM_IBPB | LAST_USER_MM_FLUSH_L1D)

/*
* We get here when we do something requiring a TLB invalidation
@@ -189,18 +192,22 @@ static void sync_current_stack_to_mm(str
}
}

-static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(struct task_struct *next)
+static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec(struct task_struct *next)
{
unsigned long next_tif = task_thread_info(next)->flags;
- unsigned long ibpb = (next_tif >> TIF_SPEC_IB) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB;
+ unsigned long bits = (next_tif >> TIF_SPEC_IB) & LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SPEC_FLUSH_L1D != TIF_SPEC_IB + 1);

- return (unsigned long)next->mm | ibpb;
+ return (unsigned long)next->mm | bits;
}

-static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct *next)
+static void cond_mitigations(struct task_struct *next)
{
- if (!next || !next->mm)
- return;
+ unsigned long prev_mm, next_mm;
+
+ prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec);
+ next_mm = mm_mangle_tif_spec(next);

/*
* Both, the conditional and the always IBPB mode use the mm
@@ -212,8 +219,6 @@ static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct
* exposed data is not really interesting.
*/
if (static_branch_likely(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb)) {
- unsigned long prev_mm, next_mm;
-
/*
* This is a bit more complex than the always mode because
* it has to handle two cases:
@@ -243,20 +248,14 @@ static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct
* Optimize this with reasonably small overhead for the
* above cases. Mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into the mm
* pointer of the incoming task which is stored in
- * cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb for comparison.
- */
- next_mm = mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(next);
- prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb);
-
- /*
+ * cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec for comparison.
+ *
* Issue IBPB only if the mm's are different and one or
* both have the IBPB bit set.
*/
if (next_mm != prev_mm &&
(next_mm | prev_mm) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB)
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
-
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, next_mm);
}

if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_always_ibpb)) {
@@ -265,11 +264,15 @@ static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct
* different context than the user space task which ran
* last on this CPU.
*/
- if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm) != next->mm) {
+ if ((prev_mm & ~LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK) !=
+ (unsigned long)next->mm)
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm, next->mm);
- }
}
+
+ if (prev_mm & LAST_USER_MM_FLUSH_L1D)
+ flush_l1d();
+
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec, next_mm);
}

void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
@@ -371,11 +374,10 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct
need_flush = true;
} else {
/*
- * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch
- * predictor when switching between processes. This stops
- * one process from doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another.
+ * Speculation vulnerability mitigations when switching
+ * to a different user space process.
*/
- cond_ibpb(tsk);
+ cond_mitigations(tsk);

if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
/*
@@ -501,7 +503,7 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void)
write_cr3(build_cr3(mm->pgd, 0));

/* Reinitialize tlbstate. */
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, LAST_USER_MM_IBPB);
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec, LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK);
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, 0);
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1);
this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[0].ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id);
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