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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2 3/5] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
On Tue, Mar 24, 2020 at 01:32:29PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> +/*
> + * Do not use this anywhere else in the kernel. This is used here because
> + * it provides an arch-agnostic way to grow the stack with correct
> + * alignment. Also, since this use is being explicitly masked to a max of
> + * 10 bits, stack-clash style attacks are unlikely. For more details see
> + * "VLAs" in Documentation/process/deprecated.rst
> + */
> +void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size);
> +
> +#define add_random_kstack_offset() do { \
> + if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \
> + &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \
> + u32 offset = this_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \
> + char *ptr = __builtin_alloca(offset & 0x3FF); \
> + asm volatile("" : "=m"(*ptr)); \

Is this asm() a homebrew OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(*ptr)? If the asm
constraints generate metter code, could we add those as alternative
constraints in OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR() ?

Mark.

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