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SubjectRe: [PATCH 70/70] x86/sev-es: Add NMI state tracking
On Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 9:07 AM Joerg Roedel <> wrote:
> Hi Andy,
> On Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 08:35:59AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 2:14 AM Joerg Roedel <> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Joerg Roedel <>
> > >
> > > Keep NMI state in SEV-ES code so the kernel can re-enable NMIs for the
> > > vCPU when it reaches IRET.
> >
> > IIRC I suggested just re-enabling NMI in C from do_nmi(). What was
> > wrong with that approach?
> If I understand the code correctly a nested NMI will just reset the
> interrupted NMI handler to start executing again at 'restart_nmi'.
> The interrupted NMI handler could be in the #VC handler, and it is not
> safe to just jump back to the start of the NMI handler from somewhere
> within the #VC handler.

Nope. A nested NMI will reset the interrupted NMI's return frame to
cause it to run again when it's done. I don't think this will have
any real interaction with #VC. There's no longjmp() here.

> So I decided to not allow NMI nesting for SEV-ES and only re-enable the
> NMI window when the first NMI returns. This is not implemented in this
> patch, but I will do that once Thomas' entry-code rewrite is upstream.

I certainly *like* preventing nesting, but I don't think we really
want a whole alternate NMI path just for a couple of messed-up AMD
generations. And the TF trick is not so pretty either.

> > This causes us to pop the NMI frame off the stack. Assuming the NMI
> > restart logic is invoked (which is maybe impossible?), we get #DB,
> > which presumably is actually delivered. And we end up on the #DB
> > stack, which might already have been in use, so we have a potential
> > increase in nesting. Also, #DB may be called from an unexpected
> > context.
> An SEV-ES hypervisor is required to intercept #DB, which means that the
> #DB exception actually ends up being a #VC exception. So it will not end
> up on the #DB stack.

With your patch set, #DB doesn't seem to end up on the #DB stack either.

> > I think there are two credible ways to approach this:
> >
> > 1. Just put the NMI unmask in do_nmi(). The kernel *already* knows
> > how to handle running do_nmi() with NMIs unmasked. This is much, much
> > simpler than your code.
> Right, and I thought about that, but the implication is that the
> complexity is moved somewhere else, namely into the #VC handler, which
> then has to be restartable.

As above, I don't think there's an actual problem here.

> > 2. Have an entirely separate NMI path for the
> > SEV-ES-on-misdesigned-CPU case. And have very clear documentation for
> > what prevents this code from being executed on future CPUs (Zen3?)
> > that have this issue fixed for real?
> That sounds like a good alternative, I will investigate this approach.
> The NMI handler should be much simpler as it doesn't need to allow NMI
> nesting. The question is, does the C code down the NMI path depend on
> the NMI handlers stack frame layout (e.g. the in-nmi flag)?

Nope. In particular, the 32-bit path doesn't have all this.

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