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Subject[PATCH 5.5 103/150] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - prevent integer overflow on large input
From: Jason A. Donenfeld <>

commit c9cc0517bba9f0213f1e55172feceb99e5512daf upstream.

This code assigns src_len (size_t) to sl (int), which causes problems
when src_len is very large. Probably nobody in the kernel should be
passing this much data to chacha20poly1305 all in one go anyway, so I
don't think we need to change the algorithm or introduce larger types
or anything. But we should at least error out early in this case and
print a warning so that we get reports if this does happen and can look
into why anybody is possibly passing it that much data or if they're
accidently passing -1 or similar.

Fixes: d95312a3ccc0 ("crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - reimplement crypt_from_sg() routine")
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <>
Cc: # 5.5+
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <>

lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ bool chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace(s
__le64 lens[2];
} b __aligned(16);

+ if (WARN_ON(src_len > INT_MAX))
+ return false;
chacha_load_key(b.k, key);

b.iv[0] = 0;

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