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Subject[PATCH 4.14 187/237] staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential security hole
From: Larry Finger <>

commit 499c405b2b80bb3a04425ba3541d20305e014d3e upstream.

In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed
to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is
never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel
heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is
specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size
of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory.
Fixes commit a2c60d42d97c ("Add files for new driver - part 16").

Reported by: Pietro Oliva <>
Cc: Pietro Oliva <>
Cc: Stable <>
Fixes: a2c60d42d97c ("staging: r8188eu: Add files for new driver - part 16")
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <>

drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
@@ -2856,7 +2856,7 @@ static int rtw_hostapd_ioctl(struct net_
goto out;

- if (!p->pointer) {
+ if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(struct ieee_param)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;

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