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SubjectRe: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
On Tue, Nov 03, 2020 at 02:52:14PM +0100, Hagen Paul Pfeifer wrote:
> > On 11/02/2020 4:40 PM Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> > > Isn't memfd_secret currently *unnecessarily* designed to be a "one task
> > > feature"? memfd_secret fulfills exactly two (generic) features:
> > >
> > > - address space isolation from kernel (aka SECRET_EXCLUSIVE, not in kernel's
> > > direct map) - hide from kernel, great
> > > - disabling processor's memory caches against speculative-execution vulnerabilities
> > > (spectre and friends, aka SECRET_UNCACHED), also great
> > >
> > > But, what about the following use-case: implementing a hardened IPC mechanism
> > > where even the kernel is not aware of any data and optionally via SECRET_UNCACHED
> > > even the hardware caches are bypassed! With the patches we are so close to
> > > achieving this.
> > >
> > > How? Shared, SECRET_EXCLUSIVE and SECRET_UNCACHED mmaped pages for IPC
> > > involved tasks required to know this mapping (and memfd_secret fd). After IPC
> > > is done, tasks can copy sensitive data from IPC pages into memfd_secret()
> > > pages, un-sensitive data can be used/copied everywhere.
> >
> > As long as the task share the file descriptor, they can share the
> > secretmem pages, pretty much like normal memfd.
>
> Including process_vm_readv() and process_vm_writev()? Let's take a hypothetical
> "dbus-daemon-secure" service that receives data from process A and wants to
> copy/distribute it to data areas of N other processes. Much like dbus but without
> SOCK_DGRAM rather direct copy into secretmem/mmap pages (ring-buffer). Should be
> possible, right?

I'm not sure I follow you here.
For process_vm_readv() and process_vm_writev() secremem will be only
accessible on the local part, but not on the remote.
So copying data to secretmem pages using process_vm_writev wouldn't
work.

> > > One missing piece is still the secure zeroization of the page(s) if the
> > > mapping is closed by last process to guarantee a secure cleanup. This can
> > > probably done as an general mmap feature, not coupled to memfd_secret() and
> > > can be done independently ("reverse" MAP_UNINITIALIZED feature).
> >
> > There are "init_on_alloc" and "init_on_free" kernel parameters that
> > enable zeroing of the pages on alloc and on free globally.
> > Anyway, I'll add zeroing of the freed memory to secretmem.
>
> Great, this allows page-specific (thus runtime-performance-optimized) zeroing
> of secured pages. init_on_free lowers the performance to much and is not precice
> enough.
>
> Hagen

--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

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