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Subject[PATCH v6 0/7] enable CAAM's HWRNG as default
Date
Everyone:

This series is a continuation of original [discussion]. I don't know
if what's in the series is enough to use CAAMs HWRNG system wide, but
I am hoping that with enough iterations and feedback it will be.

Changes since [v1]:

- Original hw_random replaced with the one using output of TRNG directly

- SEC4 DRNG IP block exposed via crypto API

- Small fix regarding use of GFP_DMA added to the series

Chagnes since [v2]:

- msleep in polling loop to avoid wasting CPU cycles

- caam_trng_read() bails out early if 'wait' is set to 'false'

- fixed typo in ZII's name

Changes since [v3]:

- DRNG's .cra_name is now "stdrng"

- collected Reviewd-by tag from Lucas

- typo fixes in commit messages of the series

Changes since [v4]:

- Dropped "crypto: caam - RNG4 TRNG errata" and "crypto: caam -
enable prediction resistance in HRWNG" to limit the scope of the
series. Those two patches are not yet ready and can be submitted
separately later.

- Collected Tested-by from Chris

Changes since [v5]:

- Series is converted back to implementing HWRNG using a job ring
as per feedback from Horia.

Feedback is welcome!

Thanks,
Andrey Smirnov

[discussion] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9850669/
[v1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191029162916.26579-1-andrew.smirnov@gmail.com
[v2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191118153843.28136-1-andrew.smirnov@gmail.com
[v3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191120165341.32669-1-andrew.smirnov@gmail.com
[v4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191121155554.1227-1-andrew.smirnov@gmail.com
[v5] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191203162357.21942-1-andrew.smirnov@gmail.com

Andrey Smirnov (7):
crypto: caam - use struct hwrng's .init for initialization
crypto: caam - drop global context pointer and init_done
crypto: caam - simplify RNG implementation
crypto: caam - check if RNG job failed
crypto: caam - invalidate entropy register during RNG initialization
crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG
crypto: caam - limit single JD RNG output to maximum of 16 bytes

drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c | 391 ++++++++++++----------------------
drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c | 33 ++-
drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h | 2 +
drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h | 5 -
drivers/crypto/caam/jr.c | 1 -
drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h | 7 +-
6 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 265 deletions(-)

--
2.21.0

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