lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2019]   [Sep]   [5]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [patch 0/6] posix-cpu-timers: Fallout fixes and permission tightening
On Thu, Sep 05, 2019 at 02:03:39PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Sysbot triggered an issue in the posix timer rework which was trivial to
> fix, but after running another test case I discovered that the rework broke
> the permission checks subtly. That's also a straightforward fix.
>
> Though when staring at it I discovered that the permission checks for
> process clocks and process timers are completely bonkers. The only
> requirement is that the target PID is a group leader. Which means that any
> process can read the clocks and attach timers to any other process without
> priviledge restrictions.
>
> That's just wrong because the clocks and timers can be used to observe
> behaviour and both reading the clocks and arming timers adds overhead and
> influences runtime performance of the target process.

Yeah I stumbled upon that by the past and found out the explanation behind
in old history: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git/commit/kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c?id=a78331f2168ef1e67b53a0f8218c70a19f0b2a4c

"This makes no constraint on who can see whose per-process clocks. This
information is already available for the VIRT and PROF (i.e. utime and stime)
information via /proc. I am open to suggestions on if/how security
constraints on who can see whose clocks should be imposed."

I'm all for mitigating that, let's just hope that won't break some ABIs.

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2019-09-05 16:49    [W:0.151 / U:3.944 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site