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SubjectRe: [PATCH v6 00/12] implement KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32
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On 2019/8/28 12:59, Scott Wood wrote:
> On Tue, 2019-08-27 at 23:05 -0500, Scott Wood wrote:
>> On Fri, 2019-08-09 at 18:07 +0800, Jason Yan wrote:
>>> Freescale Book-E
>>> parts expect lowmem to be mapped by fixed TLB entries(TLB1). The TLB1
>>> entries are not suitable to map the kernel directly in a randomized
>>> region, so we chose to copy the kernel to a proper place and restart to
>>> relocate.
>>>
>>> Entropy is derived from the banner and timer base, which will change every
>>> build and boot. This not so much safe so additionally the bootloader may
>>> pass entropy via the /chosen/kaslr-seed node in device tree.
>>
>> How complicated would it be to directly access the HW RNG (if present) that
>> early in the boot? It'd be nice if a U-Boot update weren't required (and
>> particularly concerning that KASLR would appear to work without a U-Boot
>> update, but without decent entropy).
>
> OK, I see that kaslr-seed is used on some other platforms, though arm64 aborts
> KASLR if it doesn't get a seed. I'm not sure if that's better than a loud
> warning message (or if it was a conscious choice rather than just not having
> an alternative implemented), but silently using poor entropy for something
> like this seems bad.
>

It can still make the attacker's cost higher with not so good entropy.
The same strategy exists in X86 when X86 KASLR uses RDTSC if without
X86_FEATURE_RDRAND supported. I agree that having a warning message
looks better for reminding people in this situation.

> -Scott
>
>
>
> .
>

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