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SubjectRe: [PATCH net-next v2 6/9] net: macsec: hardware offloading infrastructure
The 08/21/2019 09:20, Igor Russkikh wrote:
> > Talking about packet numbers, can you describe how PN exhaustion is
> > handled? I couldn't find much about packet numbers at all in the
> > driver patches (I hope the hw doesn't wrap around from 2^32-1 to 0 on
> > the same SA). At some point userspace needs to know that we're
> > getting close to 2^32 and that it's time to re-key. Since the whole
> > TX path of the software implementation is bypassed, it looks like the
> > PN (as far as drivers/net/macsec.c is concerned) never increases, so
> > userspace can't know when to negotiate a new SA.
>
> I think there should be driver specific implementation of this functionality.
> As an example, our macsec HW issues an interrupt towards the host to indicate
> PN threshold has reached and it's time for userspace to change the keys.
>
> In contrast, current SW macsec implementation just stops this SA/secy.
>
> > I don't see how this implementation handles non-macsec traffic (on TX,
> > that would be packets sent directly through the real interface, for
> > example by wpa_supplicant - on RX, incoming MKA traffic for
> > wpa_supplicant). Unless I missed something, incoming MKA traffic will
> > end up on the macsec interface as well as the lower interface (not
> > entirely critical, as long as wpa_supplicant can grab it on the lower
> > device, but not consistent with the software implementation). How does
> > the driver distinguish traffic that should pass through unmodified
> > from traffic that the HW needs to encapsulate and encrypt?
>
> I can comment on our HW engine - where it has special bypass rules
> for configured ethertypes. This way macsec engine skips encryption on TX and
> passes in RX unencrypted for the selected control packets.
In our case it is a TCAM which can look at various fields (including ethertype),
but is sounds like we have a vary similar design.

> But thats true, realdev driver is hard to distinguish encrypted/unencrypted
> packets. In case realdev should make a decision where to put RX packet,
> it only may do some heuristic (since after macsec decription all the
> macsec related info is dropped. Thats true at least for our HW implementation).
Same for ours.

> > If you look at IPsec offloading, the networking stack builds up the
> > ESP header, and passes the unencrypted data down to the driver. I'm
> > wondering if the same would be possible with MACsec offloading: the
> > macsec virtual interface adds the header (and maybe a dummy ICV), and
> > then the HW does the encryption. In case of HW that needs to add the
> > sectag itself, the driver would first strip the headers that the stack
> > created. On receive, the driver would recreate a sectag and the macsec
> > interface would just skip all verification (decrypt, PN).
>
> I don't think this way is good, as driver have to do per packet header mangling.
> That'll harm linerate performance heavily.
Agree, and it will also prevent MACsec offload in offloaded bridge devices.

/Allan

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