lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2019]   [Jul]   [15]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
/
SubjectRe: [PATCH V35 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
From
Date
On 7/15/19 9:59 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>
> bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
> private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
> has been locked down in confidentiality mode.
>
> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
> cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> ---
> include/linux/security.h | 1 +
> kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 10 ++++++++++
> security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 +
> 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 987d8427f091..8dd1741a52cd 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
> LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
> LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
> LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
> + LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
> LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
> };
>
> diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> index ca1255d14576..605908da61c5 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> @@ -142,7 +142,12 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const void *, unsafe_ptr)
> {
> int ret;
>
> + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out;
> +
> ret = probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
> +out:
> if (unlikely(ret < 0))
> memset(dst, 0, size);

Hmm, does security_locked_down() ever return a code > 0 or why do you
have the double check on return code? If not, then for clarity the
ret code from security_locked_down() should be checked as 'ret < 0'
as well and out label should be at the memset directly instead.

> @@ -569,6 +574,10 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
> {
> int ret;
>
> + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out;
> +
> /*
> * The strncpy_from_unsafe() call will likely not fill the entire
> * buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing
> @@ -579,6 +588,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
> * is returned that can be used for bpf_perf_event_output() et al.
> */
> ret = strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
> +out:
> if (unlikely(ret < 0))
> memset(dst, 0, size);

Ditto.

Thanks,
Daniel

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2019-07-16 00:55    [W:0.265 / U:10.576 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site