lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2019]   [Jul]   [1]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: general protection fault in do_move_mount (2)
On Mon, Jul 01, 2019 at 04:59:04PM +0200, 'Dmitry Vyukov' via syzkaller-bugs wrote:
> >
> > Dmitry, any idea why syzbot found such a bizarre reproducer for this?
> > This is actually reproducible by a simple single threaded program:
> >
> > #include <unistd.h>
> >
> > #define __NR_move_mount 429
> > #define MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000004
> >
> > int main()
> > {
> > int fds[2];
> >
> > pipe(fds);
> > syscall(__NR_move_mount, fds[0], "", -1, "/", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH);
> > }
>
>
> There is no pipe in the reproducer, so it could not theoretically come
> up with the reproducer with the pipe. During minimization syzkaller
> only tries to remove syscalls and simplify arguments and execution
> mode.
> What would be the simplest reproducer expressed as further
> minimization of this reproducer?
> https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=154e8c2aa00000
> I assume one of the syscalls is still move_mount, but what is the
> other one? If it's memfd_create, or open of the procfs file, then it
> seems that [ab]used heavy threading and syscall colliding as way to do
> an arbitrary mutation of the program. Per se results of
> memfd_create/procfs are not passed to move_mount. But by abusing races
> it probably managed to do so in small percent of cases. It would also
> explain why it's hard to reproduce.

To be clear, memfd_create() works just as well:

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#define __NR_move_mount 429
#define MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000004

int main()
{
int fd = memfd_create("foo", 0);

syscall(__NR_move_mount, fd, "", -1, "/", MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH);
}

I just changed it to pipe() in my example, because pipe() is less obscure.

>
>
> > FYI, it also isn't really appropriate for syzbot to bisect all bugs in new
> > syscalls to wiring them up to x86, and then blame all the x86 maintainers.
> > Normally such bugs will be in the syscall itself, regardless of architecture.
>
> Agree. Do you think it's something worth handling automatically
> (stands out of the long tail of other inappropriate cases)? If so, how
> could we detect such cases? It seems that some of these predicates are
> quite hard to program. Similar things happen with introduction of new
> bug detection tools and checks, wiring any functionality to new access
> points and similar things.
>

Yes, this case could easily be automatically detected (most of the time) by
listing the filenames changed in the commit, and checking whether they all match
the pattern syscall.*\.tbl. Sure, it's not common, but it could be alongside
other similar straightforward checks like checking for merge commits and
checking for commits that only modify Documentation/.

I'm not even asking for more correct bisection results at this point, I'm just
asking for fewer bad bisection results.

- Eric

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2019-07-01 17:18    [W:0.148 / U:1.344 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site