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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:31:50PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> This series is the result of a rather absurd amount of discussion over
> how to get SGX to play nice with LSM policies, without having to resort
> to evil shenanigans or put undue burden on userspace. The discussion
> definitely wandered into completely insane territory at times, but I
> think/hope we ended up with something reasonable.

By definition this is a broken series because it does not apply to
mainline. Even RFC series should at least apply. Would be better idea to
discuss design ideas and use snippets instead. Now you have to take
original v20 and apply to these patches to evaluate anything.

> The basic gist of the approach is to require userspace to declare what
> protections are maximally allowed for any given page, e.g. add a flags
> field for loading enclave pages that takes ALLOW_{READ,WRITE,EXEC}. LSMs
> can then adjust the allowed protections, e.g. clear ALLOW_EXEC to prevent
> ever mapping the page with PROT_EXEC. SGX enforces the allowed perms
> via a new mprotect() vm_ops hook, e.g. like regular mprotect() uses

mprotect() does not use MAY_{READ,WRITE,EXEC} constants. It uses

What are ALLOW_{READ,WRITE,EXEC} and how they are used? What does the
hook do and why it is in vm_ops and not in file_operations? Are they
arguments to the ioctl or internal variables that are set based on


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