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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 01:29:10PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 4:32 PM Sean Christopherson
> <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
> > static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr,
> > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > index 47f58cfb6a19..0562775424a0 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> > @@ -1446,6 +1446,14 @@
> > * @bpf_prog_free_security:
> > * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog.
> > *
> > + * Security hooks for Intel SGX enclaves.
> > + *
> > + * @enclave_load:
> > + * On success, returns 0 and optionally adjusts @allowed_prot
> > + * @vma: the source memory region of the enclave page being loaded.
> > + * @prot: the initial protection of the enclave page.
>
> What do you mean "initial"? The page is always mapped PROT_NONE when
> this is called, right? I feel like I must be missing something here.

Initial protection in the EPCM. Yet another reason to ignore SECINFO.

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