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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH v5 1/1] Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.
On Wed, Jun 19 2019 at  3:10pm -0400,
Jaskaran Khurana <> wrote:

> The verification is to support cases where the roothash is not secured by
> Trusted Boot, UEFI Secureboot or similar technologies.
> One of the use cases for this is for dm-verity volumes mounted after boot,
> the root hash provided during the creation of the dm-verity volume has to
> be secure and thus in-kernel validation implemented here will be used
> before we trust the root hash and allow the block device to be created.
> The signature being provided for verification must verify the root hash and
> must be trusted by the builtin keyring for verification to succeed.
> The hash is added as a key of type "user" and the description is passed to
> the kernel so it can look it up and use it for verification.
> Kernel commandline parameter will indicate whether to check (only if
> specified) or force (for all dm verity volumes) roothash signature
> verification.
> Kernel commandline: dm_verity.verify_sig=1 or 2 for check/force root hash
> signature validation respectively.
> Signed-off-by: Jaskaran Khurana <>

Milan and/or others: could you please provide review and if you're OK
with this patch respond accordingly?


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