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SubjectRe: [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling
On Wed, May 08, 2019 at 05:43:20PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> = Intro =
> The patchset brings enabling of Intel Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption.
> It consists of changes into multiple subsystems:
> * Core MM: infrastructure for allocation pages, dealing with encrypted VMAs
> and providing API setup encrypted mappings.

That wasn't eye-bleeding bad. With exception of the refcounting; that
looks like something that can easily go funny without people noticing.

> * arch/x86: feature enumeration, program keys into hardware, setup
> page table entries for encrypted pages and more.

That seemed incomplete (pageattr seems to be a giant hole).

> * Key management service: setup and management of encryption keys.
> * DMA/IOMMU: dealing with encrypted memory on IO side.

Just minor nits, someone else would have to look at this.

> * KVM: interaction with virtualization side.

You really want to limit the damage random modules can do. They have no
business writing to the mktme variables.

> * Documentation: description of APIs and usage examples.

Didn't bother with those; if the Changelogs are inadequate to make sense
of the patches documentation isn't the right place to fix things.

> The patchset is huge. This submission aims to give view to the full picture and
> get feedback on the overall design. The patchset will be split into more
> digestible pieces later.
> Please review. Any feedback is welcome.

I still can't tell if this is worth the complexity :-/

Yes, there's a lot of words, but it doesn't mean anything to me, that
is, nothing here makes me want to build my kernel with this 'feature'

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