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Subject[PATCH 3.16 214/305] HID: uhid: forbid UHID_CREATE under KERNEL_DS or elevated privileges
3.16.63-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.


From: Eric Biggers <>

commit 8c01db7619f07c85c5cd81ec5eb83608b56c88f5 upstream.

When a UHID_CREATE command is written to the uhid char device, a
copy_from_user() is done from a user pointer embedded in the command.
When the address limit is KERNEL_DS, e.g. as is the case during
sys_sendfile(), this can read from kernel memory. Alternatively,
information can be leaked from a setuid binary that is tricked to write
to the file descriptor. Therefore, forbid UHID_CREATE in these cases.

No other commands in uhid_char_write() are affected by this bug and
UHID_CREATE is marked as "obsolete", so apply the restriction to
UHID_CREATE only rather than to uhid_char_write() entirely.

Thanks to Dmitry Vyukov for adding uhid definitions to syzkaller and to
Jann Horn for commit 9da3f2b740544 ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess
helpers fault on kernel addresses"), allowing this bug to be found.

Fixes: d365c6cfd337 ("HID: uhid: add UHID_CREATE and UHID_DESTROY events")
Cc: Jann Horn <>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16; Directly include <linux/uaccess.h>]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <>
--- a/drivers/hid/uhid.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@

#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/hid.h>
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/uhid.h>
#include <linux/wait.h>

@@ -676,6 +678,17 @@ static ssize_t uhid_char_write(struct fi

switch (uhid->input_buf.type) {
+ /*
+ * 'struct uhid_create_req' contains a __user pointer which is
+ * copied from, so it's unsafe to allow this with elevated
+ * privileges (e.g. from a setuid binary) or via kernel_write().
+ */
+ if (file->f_cred != current_cred() || uaccess_kernel()) {
+ pr_err_once("UHID_CREATE from different security context by process %d (%s), this is not allowed.\n",
+ task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
ret = uhid_dev_create(uhid, &uhid->input_buf);
 \ /
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