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SubjectRe: [PATCH v5 3/5] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth register
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Hi James,

On 1/31/19 9:55 PM, James Morse wrote:
> Hi Amit,
>
> On 28/01/2019 06:58, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
>> When pointer authentication is supported, a guest may wish to use it.
>> This patch adds the necessary KVM infrastructure for this to work, with
>> a semi-lazy context switch of the pointer auth state.
>>
>> Pointer authentication feature is only enabled when VHE is built
>> into the kernel and present into CPU implementation so only VHE code
>
> ~s/into/in the/?
>
>> paths are modified.
>>
>> When we schedule a vcpu, we disable guest usage of pointer
>> authentication instructions and accesses to the keys. While these are
>> disabled, we avoid context-switching the keys. When we trap the guest
>> trying to use pointer authentication functionality, we change to eagerly
>> context-switching the keys, and enable the feature. The next time the
>> vcpu is scheduled out/in, we start again.
>
>> Pointer authentication consists of address authentication and generic
>> authentication, and CPUs in a system might have varied support for
>> either. Where support for either feature is not uniform, it is hidden
>> from guests via ID register emulation, as a result of the cpufeature
>> framework in the host.
>
>
>> Unfortunately, address authentication and generic authentication cannot
>> be trapped separately, as the architecture provides a single EL2 trap
>> covering both. If we wish to expose one without the other, we cannot
>> prevent a (badly-written) guest from intermittently using a feature
>> which is not uniformly supported (when scheduled on a physical CPU which
>> supports the relevant feature). When the guest is scheduled on a
>> physical CPU lacking the feature, these attempts will result in an UNDEF
>> being taken by the guest.
>
> This won't be fun. Can't KVM check that both are supported on all CPUs to avoid
> this? ...
The above message is confusing as both checks actually present. I will
update.
>
>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
>> index dfcfba7..e1bf2a5 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
>> @@ -612,6 +612,11 @@ static inline bool system_supports_generic_auth(void)
>> cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_GENERIC_AUTH_IMP_DEF));
>> }
>>
>> +static inline bool kvm_supports_ptrauth(void)
>> +{
>> + return system_supports_address_auth() && system_supports_generic_auth();
>> +}
>
> ... oh you do check. Could you cover this in the commit message? (to avoid an
> UNDEF being taken by the guest we ... )
>
> cpufeature.h is a strange place to put this, there are no other kvm symbols in
> there. But there are users of system_supports_foo() in kvm_host.h.
ok will check.
>
>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..0576c01
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +/*
>> + * arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c: Guest/host ptrauth save/restore
>> + *
>> + * Copyright 2018 Arm Limited
>> + * Author: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
>> + * Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
>> + */
>> +#include <linux/compiler.h>
>> +#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
>> +
>> +#include <asm/cpucaps.h>
>> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
>> +#include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
>> +#include <asm/kvm_hyp.h>
>> +#include <asm/pointer_auth.h>
>> +
>> +static __always_inline bool __hyp_text __ptrauth_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> Why __always_inline? Doesn't the compiler decide for 'static' symbols in C files?
This is to make the function pointer authentication safe. Although it
placed before key switch so may not be required.
>
>
>> +{
>> + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH) &&
>> + vcpu->arch.ctxt.hcr_el2 & (HCR_API | HCR_APK);
>> +}
>> +
>> +void __no_ptrauth __hyp_text __ptrauth_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> + struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt,
>> + struct kvm_cpu_context *guest_ctxt)
>> +{
>> + if (!__ptrauth_is_enabled(vcpu))
>> + return;
>> +
>
>> + ptrauth_keys_store((struct ptrauth_keys *) &host_ctxt->sys_regs[APIAKEYLO_EL1]);
>
> We can't cast part of an array to a structure like this. What happens if the
> compiler inserts padding in struct-ptrauth_keys, or the struct randomization
> thing gets hold of it: https://lwn.net/Articles/722293/
Yes this has got issue.
>
> If we want to use the helpers that take a struct-ptrauth_keys, we need to keep
> the keys in a struct-ptrauth_keys. To do this we'd need to provide accessors so
> that GET_ONE_REG() of APIAKEYLO_EL1 comes from the struct-ptrauth_keys, instead
> of the sys_reg array.
ok.
>
>
> Wouldn't the host keys be available somewhere else? (they must get transfer to
> secondary CPUs somehow). Can we skip the save step when switching from the host?
Yes Host save can be done during vcpu_load and it works fine. However it
does not work during hypervisor configuration stage(i.e where HCR_EL2 is
saved/restored now) as keys are different.
>
>> + ptrauth_keys_switch((struct ptrauth_keys *) &guest_ctxt->sys_regs[APIAKEYLO_EL1]);
>> +}
>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> index 1f2d237..c798d0c 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> @@ -439,6 +451,18 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_requires_vhe(void)
>> return false;
>> }
>>
>> +void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_enable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>> +void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_disable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>> +
>> +static inline void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> + /* Disable ptrauth and use it in a lazy context via traps */
>> + if (has_vhe() && kvm_supports_ptrauth())
>> + kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_disable(vcpu);
>> +}
>
> (Could you move 'has_vhe()' into kvm_supports_ptrauth()? It fits with testing
> the other cpufeatures, and makes this a little more readable when you add
> 'allowed' to it later.)
yes.
>
>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
>> index 03b36f1..301d332 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c
>> @@ -483,6 +483,8 @@ int kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> sysreg_restore_guest_state_vhe(guest_ctxt);
>> __debug_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
>>
>> + __ptrauth_switch_to_guest(vcpu, host_ctxt, guest_ctxt);
>> +
>> __set_guest_arch_workaround_state(vcpu);
>>
>> do {
>> @@ -494,6 +496,8 @@ int kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>
>> __set_host_arch_workaround_state(vcpu);
>>
>> + __ptrauth_switch_to_host(vcpu, host_ctxt, guest_ctxt);
>> +
>> sysreg_save_guest_state_vhe(guest_ctxt);
>>
>> __deactivate_traps(vcpu);
>
> ...This makes me nervous...
>
> __guest_enter() is a function that (might) change the keys, then we change them
> again here. We can't have any signed return address between these two points. I
> don't trust the compiler not to generate any.
>
> ~
>
> I had a chat with some friendly compiler folk... because there are two identical
> sequences in kvm_vcpu_run_vhe() and __kvm_vcpu_run_nvhe(), the compiler could
> move the common code to a function it then calls. Apparently this is called
> 'function outlining'.
>
> If the compiler does this, and the guest changes the keys, I think we would fail
> the return address check.
>
> Painting the whole thing with no_prauth would solve this, but this code then
> becomes a target.
> Because the compiler can't anticipate the keys changing, we ought to treat them
> the same way we do the callee saved registers, stack-pointer etc, and
> save/restore them in the __guest_enter() assembly code.
>
> (we can still keep the save/restore in C, but call it from assembly so we know
> nothing new is going on the stack).
I checked this and it seems easy to put inside guest_enter/guest_exit.

//Amit D
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> James
>

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