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SubjectRe: [PATCH 3/8] fscrypt: Change format of no-key token
On Mon, Dec 02, 2019 at 09:10:44PM -0800, Daniel Rosenberg wrote:
> Encrypted and casefolded names always require a dirtree hash, since
> their hash values cannot be generated without the key.

I feel like there should be another paragraph here that explains more clearly
(including for people who may not as familiar with fscrypt) what is meant by a
"no-key token", why they need to be changed, and why they are being changed even
for non-casefolded directories.

>
> In the new format, we always base64 encode the same structure. For names
> that are less than 149 characters, we concatenate the provided hash and
> ciphertext. If the name is longer than 149 characters, we also include
> the sha256 of the remaining parts of the name. We then base64 encode the
> resulting data to get a representation of the name that is at most 252
> characters long, with a very low collision rate. We avoid needing to
> compute the sha256 apart from in the case of a very long filename, and
> then only need to compute the sha256 of possible matches if their
> ciphertext is also longer than 149.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
> ---
> fs/crypto/Kconfig | 1 +
> fs/crypto/fname.c | 182 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> include/linux/fscrypt.h | 92 ++++++--------------
> 3 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/crypto/Kconfig b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
> index ff5a1746cbae..6e0d56f0b993 100644
> --- a/fs/crypto/Kconfig
> +++ b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ config FS_ENCRYPTION
> select CRYPTO_CTS
> select CRYPTO_SHA512
> select CRYPTO_HMAC
> + select CRYPTO_SHA256
> select KEYS
> help
> Enable encryption of files and directories. This
> diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c
> index b33f03b9f892..03c837c461f2 100644
> --- a/fs/crypto/fname.c
> +++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c
> @@ -14,8 +14,46 @@
> #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
> #include <linux/siphash.h>
> #include <crypto/skcipher.h>
> +#include <crypto/hash.h>
> #include "fscrypt_private.h"
>
> +static struct crypto_shash *sha256_hash_tfm;
> +
> +static int fscrypt_do_sha256(unsigned char *result,
> + const u8 *data, unsigned int data_len)
> +{
> + struct crypto_shash *tfm = READ_ONCE(sha256_hash_tfm);
> +
> + if (unlikely(!tfm)) {
> + struct crypto_shash *prev_tfm;
> +
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> + if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
> + fscrypt_warn(NULL,
> + "Missing crypto API support for SHA-256");
> + return -ENOPKG;
> + }

No need to check for -ENOENT specifically here, since this patch makes
CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION select CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256, so sha256 will always be
available. Just handle -ENOENT like any other error.

> + fscrypt_err(NULL,
> + "Error allocating SHA-256 transform: %ld",
> + PTR_ERR(tfm));
> + return PTR_ERR(tfm);
> + }
> + prev_tfm = cmpxchg(&sha256_hash_tfm, NULL, tfm);
> + if (prev_tfm) {
> + crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> + tfm = prev_tfm;
> + }
> + }
> + {
> + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
> +
> + desc->tfm = tfm;
> +
> + return crypto_shash_digest(desc, data, data_len, result);
> + }
> +}
> +
> static inline bool fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(const struct qstr *str)
> {
> if (str->len == 1 && str->name[0] == '.')
> @@ -208,8 +246,7 @@ int fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(const struct inode *inode,
> struct fscrypt_str *crypto_str)
> {
> const u32 max_encoded_len =
> - max_t(u32, BASE64_CHARS(FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE),
> - 1 + BASE64_CHARS(sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)));
> + BASE64_CHARS(sizeof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name));
> u32 max_presented_len;
>
> max_presented_len = max(max_encoded_len, max_encrypted_len);
> @@ -243,8 +280,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_free_buffer);
> * The caller must have allocated sufficient memory for the @oname string.
> *
> * If the key is available, we'll decrypt the disk name; otherwise, we'll encode
> - * it for presentation. Short names are directly base64-encoded, while long
> - * names are encoded in fscrypt_digested_name format.
> + * it for presentation. The usr name is the base64 encoding of the dirtree hash
> + * value, the first 149 characters of the name, and the sha256 of the rest of
> + * the name, if longer than 149 characters.

Maybe write just "If the key is available, we'll decrypt the disk name;
otherwise, we'll encode it for presentation in fscrypt_nokey_name format.
See struct fscrypt_nokey_name for details."

... since this comment doesn't really need to go into the details that are
already covered in the long comment above struct fscrypt_nokey_name.

> *
> * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
> */
> @@ -254,7 +292,9 @@ int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
> struct fscrypt_str *oname)
> {
> const struct qstr qname = FSTR_TO_QSTR(iname);
> - struct fscrypt_digested_name digested_name;
> + struct fscrypt_nokey_name nokey_name;
> + u32 size;
> + int err = 0;
>
> if (fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(&qname)) {
> oname->name[0] = '.';
> @@ -269,25 +309,29 @@ int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
> if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode))
> return fname_decrypt(inode, iname, oname);
>
> - if (iname->len <= FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE) {
> - oname->len = base64_encode(iname->name, iname->len,
> - oname->name);
> - return 0;
> - }
> + size = min_t(u32, iname->len, FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE);
> + memcpy(nokey_name.bytes, iname->name, size);
> +
> if (hash) {
> - digested_name.hash = hash;
> - digested_name.minor_hash = minor_hash;
> + nokey_name.dirtree_hash[0] = hash;
> + nokey_name.dirtree_hash[1] = minor_hash;
> } else {
> - digested_name.hash = 0;
> - digested_name.minor_hash = 0;
> + nokey_name.dirtree_hash[0] = 0;
> + nokey_name.dirtree_hash[1] = 0;
> }
> - memcpy(digested_name.digest,
> - FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(iname->name, iname->len),
> - FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE);
> - oname->name[0] = '_';
> - oname->len = 1 + base64_encode((const u8 *)&digested_name,
> - sizeof(digested_name), oname->name + 1);
> - return 0;
> + size += sizeof(nokey_name.dirtree_hash);
> +
> + if (iname->len > FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE) {
> + /* compute sha256 of remaining name */
> + err = fscrypt_do_sha256(nokey_name.sha256,
> + &iname->name[FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE],
> + iname->len - FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> + size += sizeof(nokey_name.sha256);
> + }
> + oname->len = base64_encode((const u8 *)&nokey_name, size, oname->name);
> + return err;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr);
>
> @@ -319,7 +363,6 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
> int lookup, struct fscrypt_name *fname)

This function has a comment that needs to be updated:

* Else, for keyless @lookup operations, @iname is the presented ciphertext, so
* we decode it to get either the ciphertext disk_name (for short names) or the
* fscrypt_digested_name (for long names). Non-@lookup operations will be
* impossible in this case, so we fail them with ENOKEY.

=>

* Else, for keyless @lookup operations, @iname is the presented ciphertext, so
* we decode it to get the fscrypt_nokey_name. Non-@lookup operations will be
* impossible in this case, so we fail them with ENOKEY.

> {
> int ret;
> - int digested;
>
> memset(fname, 0, sizeof(struct fscrypt_name));
> fname->usr_fname = iname;
> @@ -359,42 +402,32 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
> * We don't have the key and we are doing a lookup; decode the
> * user-supplied name
> */
> - if (iname->name[0] == '_') {
> - if (iname->len !=
> - 1 + BASE64_CHARS(sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)))
> - return -ENOENT;
> - digested = 1;
> - } else {
> - if (iname->len >
> - BASE64_CHARS(FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE))
> - return -ENOENT;
> - digested = 0;
> - }
>
> fname->crypto_buf.name =
> - kmalloc(max_t(size_t, FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE,
> - sizeof(struct fscrypt_digested_name)),
> - GFP_KERNEL);
> + kmalloc(sizeof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (fname->crypto_buf.name == NULL)
> return -ENOMEM;

Need to validate that the filename isn't too long before decoding it. Otherwise
it might overflow this buffer.

>
> - ret = base64_decode(iname->name + digested, iname->len - digested,
> + ret = base64_decode(iname->name, iname->len,
> fname->crypto_buf.name);
> if (ret < 0) {
> ret = -ENOENT;
> goto errout;
> }
> - fname->crypto_buf.len = ret;
> - if (digested) {
> - const struct fscrypt_digested_name *n =
> - (const void *)fname->crypto_buf.name;
> - fname->hash = n->hash;
> - fname->minor_hash = n->minor_hash;
> - } else {
> - fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
> - fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
> + if (ret > (int)offsetofend(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, sha256)) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto errout;
> + }

This should be -ENOENT rather than -EINVAL, since we should report that the file
does not exist.

> +
> + {
> + struct fscrypt_nokey_name *n =
> + (void *)fname->crypto_buf.name;

'n' (which maybe should be called 'nokey_name'?) could be declared at the
beginning of the function so that it doesn't have to go into this separate
block.

> + fname->crypto_buf.len = ret;
> +
> + fname->hash = n->dirtree_hash[0];
> + fname->minor_hash = n->dirtree_hash[1];

Need to validate that these fields are actually included in the buffer that was
decoded, since it could be shorter.

> +/**
> + * fscrypt_match_name() - test whether the given name matches a directory entry
> + * @fname: the name being searched for
> + * @de_name: the name from the directory entry
> + * @de_name_len: the length of @de_name in bytes
> + *
> + * Normally @fname->disk_name will be set, and in that case we simply compare
> + * that to the name stored in the directory entry. The only exception is that
> + * if we don't have the key for an encrypted directory and a filename in it is
> + * very long, then we won't have the full disk_name and we'll instead need to
> + * match against the fscrypt_digested_name.

Comment needs to be updated.

> + bool check_sha256 = false;
> + u8 sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
> +
> + if (fname->crypto_buf.len ==
> + offsetofend(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, sha256)) {
> + len = FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE;
> + check_sha256 = true;
> + } else {
> + len = fname->crypto_buf.len -
> + offsetof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, bytes);
> + }
> + if (!check_sha256 && de_name_len != len)
> + return false;
> + if (check_sha256 && de_name_len <= len)
> + return false;
> + if (memcmp(de_name, n->bytes, len) != 0)
> + return false;
> + if (check_sha256) {
> + fscrypt_do_sha256(sha256,
> + &de_name[FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE],
> + de_name_len - FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE);
> + if (memcmp(sha256, n->sha256, sizeof(sha256)) != 0)
> + return false;
> + }

It's hard to understand what's going on here. It would be easier to read if the
SHA-256 and non-SHA-256 cases were cleanly separated, e.g.:

if (fname->crypto_buf.len ==
offsetofend(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, sha256)) {
u8 sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];

if (de_name_len <= FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE)
return false;
if (memcmp(de_name, n->bytes,
FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE) != 0)
return false;
fscrypt_do_sha256(sha256,
&de_name[FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE],
de_name_len - FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE);
if (memcmp(sha256, n->sha256, sizeof(sha256)) != 0)
return false;
} else {
u32 len = fname->crypto_buf.len -
offsetof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, bytes);

if (de_name_len != len)
return false;
if (memcmp(de_name, n->bytes, len) != 0)
return false;
}

Also, I'm not sure it's a good idea to have so many hardcoded references to
SHA-256, since that this algorithm could be changed later. It might be good to
use something more generic like 'strong_hash'.

> +
> + return true;
> + }
> +
> + if (de_name_len != fname->disk_name.len)
> + return false;
> + return !memcmp(de_name, fname->disk_name.name, fname->disk_name.len);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_match_name);
> +
> /**
> * fscrypt_fname_siphash() - Calculate the siphash for a file name
> * @dir: the parent directory
> diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
> index 028aed925e51..ddb7245ba92b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
> #include <linux/fs.h>
> #include <linux/mm.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <crypto/sha.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/fscrypt.h>
>
> #define FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE 16
> @@ -160,79 +161,34 @@ extern int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *, u32, u32,
> extern u64 fscrypt_fname_siphash(const struct inode *dir,
> const struct qstr *name);
>
> -#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE 32
> -
> -/* Extracts the second-to-last ciphertext block; see explanation below */
> -#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(name, len) \
> - ((name) + round_down((len) - FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE - 1, \
> - FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE))
> -
> -#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE
> -
> /**
> - * fscrypt_digested_name - alternate identifier for an on-disk filename
> + * fscrypt_nokey_name - identifier for on-disk filenames when key is not present

Now that fscrypt_match_name() is no longer an inline function, the definition of
struct fscrypt_nokey_name should be moved to fs/crypto/fname.c, since
filesystems don't need it directly anymore.

> *
> - * When userspace lists an encrypted directory without access to the key,
> - * filenames whose ciphertext is longer than FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE
> - * bytes are shown in this abbreviated form (base64-encoded) rather than as the
> - * full ciphertext (base64-encoded). This is necessary to allow supporting
> - * filenames up to NAME_MAX bytes, since base64 encoding expands the length.
> + * When userspace lists an encrypted directory without access to the key, we
> + * must present them with a unique identifier for the file. base64 encoding will
> + * expand the space, so we use this format to avoid most collisions.
> *
> - * To make it possible for filesystems to still find the correct directory entry
> - * despite not knowing the full on-disk name, we encode any filesystem-specific
> - * 'hash' and/or 'minor_hash' which the filesystem may need for its lookups,
> - * followed by the second-to-last ciphertext block of the filename. Due to the
> - * use of the CBC-CTS encryption mode, the second-to-last ciphertext block
> - * depends on the full plaintext. (Note that ciphertext stealing causes the
> - * last two blocks to appear "flipped".) This makes accidental collisions very
> - * unlikely: just a 1 in 2^128 chance for two filenames to collide even if they
> - * share the same filesystem-specific hashes.
> - *
> - * However, this scheme isn't immune to intentional collisions, which can be
> - * created by anyone able to create arbitrary plaintext filenames and view them
> - * without the key. Making the "digest" be a real cryptographic hash like
> - * SHA-256 over the full ciphertext would prevent this, although it would be
> - * less efficient and harder to implement, especially since the filesystem would
> - * need to calculate it for each directory entry examined during a search.
> + * Filesystems may rely on the hash being present to look up a file on disk.
> + * For filenames that are both casefolded and encrypted, it is not possible to
> + * calculate the hash without the key. Additionally, if the ciphertext is longer
> + * than what we can base64 encode, we cannot generate the hash from the partial
> + * name. For simplicity, we always store the hash at the front of the name,
> + * followed by the first 149 bytes of the ciphertext, and then the sha256 of the
> + * remainder of the name if the ciphertext was longer than 149 bytes. For the
> + * usual case of relatively short filenames, this allows us to avoid needing to
> + * compute the sha256. This results in an encoded name that is at most 252 bytes
> + * long.
> */
> -struct fscrypt_digested_name {
> - u32 hash;
> - u32 minor_hash;
> - u8 digest[FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE];
> -};
[...]

> +#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE 149

I assume that FSCRYPT_FNAME_UNDIGESTED_SIZE is 149 in particular because it
makes the base64 encoding of struct fscrypt_nokey_name fit in NAME_MAX. Can you
please add a BUILD_BUG_ON() which verifies this assumption at build time?

- Eric

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