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SubjectRe: [PATCH v1 0/3] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability for secure Perf users groups
On 12/11/2019 12:36 PM, Andi Kleen wrote:
>>> In this circumstances CAP_SYS_PERFMON looks like smart balanced advancement that
>>> trade-offs between perf_events subsystem extensions, required level of control
>>> and configurability of perf_events, existing users adoption effort, and it brings
>>> security hardening benefits of decreasing attack surface for the existing users
>>> and use cases.
>> I'm not 100% opposed to CAP_SYS_PERFMON. I am 100% opposed to new capabilities
>> that have a single use. Surely there are other CAP_SYS_ADMIN users that [cs]ould
>> be converted to CAP_SYS_PERFMON as well. If there is a class of system performance
>> privileged operations, say a dozen or so, you may have a viable argument.
> perf events is not a single use.

If it is only being called in two places, it is single use.

> It has a bazillion of sub functionalities,
> including hardware tracing, software tracing, pmu counters, software counters,
> uncore counters, break points and various other stuff in its PMU drivers.
> See it more as a whole quite heterogenous driver subsystem.
> I guess CAP_SYS_PERFMON is not a good name because perf is much more
> than just Perfmon. Perhaps call it CAP_SYS_PERF_EVENTS
> -Andi

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