lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2019]   [Dec]   [10]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [PATCH v8 2/7] KVM: VMX: Define CET VMCS fields and #CP flag
On Fri, Nov 01, 2019 at 04:52:17PM +0800, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> CET(Control-flow Enforcement Technology) is an upcoming Intel(R)
> processor feature that blocks Return/Jump-Oriented Programming(ROP)
> attacks. It provides the following capabilities to defend
> against ROP/JOP style control-flow subversion attacks:
>
> Shadow Stack (SHSTK):
> A second stack for program which is used exclusively for
> control transfer operations.
>
> Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT):
> Code branching protection to defend against jump/call oriented
> programming.
>
> Several new CET MSRs are defined in kernel to support CET:
> MSR_IA32_{U,S}_CET: Controls the CET settings for user
> mode and suervisor mode respectively.
>
> MSR_IA32_PL{0,1,2,3}_SSP: Stores shadow stack pointers for
> CPL-0,1,2,3 level respectively.
>
> MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB: Stores base address of shadow stack
> pointer table.
>
> Two XSAVES state bits are introduced for CET:
> IA32_XSS:[bit 11]: For saving/restoring user mode CET states
> IA32_XSS:[bit 12]: For saving/restoring supervisor mode CET states.
>
> Six VMCS fields are introduced for CET:
> {HOST,GUEST}_S_CET: Stores CET settings for supervisor mode.
> {HOST,GUEST}_SSP: Stores shadow stack pointer for supervisor mode.
> {HOST,GUEST}_INTR_SSP_TABLE: Stores base address of shadow stack pointer
> table.
>
> If VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE = 1, the host's CET MSRs are restored
> from below VMCS fields at VM-Exit:
> HOST_S_CET
> HOST_SSP
> HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE
>
> If VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE = 1, the guest's CET MSRs are loaded
> from below VMCS fields at VM-Entry:
> GUEST_S_CET
> GUEST_SSP
> GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE
>
> Co-developed-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 8 ++++++++
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 5 +++--
> 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> index a39136b0d509..68bca290a203 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
> #define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS 0x00800000
> #define VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x01000000
> #define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x02000000
> +#define VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE 0x10000000
>
> #define VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x00036dff
>
> @@ -103,6 +104,7 @@
> #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS 0x00010000
> #define VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x00020000
> #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x00040000
> +#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE 0x00100000
>
> #define VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x000011ff
>
> @@ -321,6 +323,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
> GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS = 0x00006822,
> GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP = 0x00006824,
> GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP = 0x00006826,
> + GUEST_S_CET = 0x00006828,
> + GUEST_SSP = 0x0000682a,
> + GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE = 0x0000682c,
> HOST_CR0 = 0x00006c00,
> HOST_CR3 = 0x00006c02,
> HOST_CR4 = 0x00006c04,
> @@ -333,6 +338,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
> HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP = 0x00006c12,
> HOST_RSP = 0x00006c14,
> HOST_RIP = 0x00006c16,
> + HOST_S_CET = 0x00006c18,
> + HOST_SSP = 0x00006c1a,
> + HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE = 0x00006c1c
> };
>
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> index 503d3f42da16..e68d6b448730 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
> @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
> #define MC_VECTOR 18
> #define XM_VECTOR 19
> #define VE_VECTOR 20
> +#define CP_VECTOR 21
>
> /* Select x86 specific features in <linux/kvm.h> */
> #define __KVM_HAVE_PIT
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 290c3c3efb87..540490d5385f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ static int exception_class(int vector)
> case NP_VECTOR:
> case SS_VECTOR:
> case GP_VECTOR:
> + case CP_VECTOR:
> return EXCPT_CONTRIBUTORY;
> default:
> break;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> index f10c12b5197d..7e7b5b5cc956 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static inline bool x86_exception_has_error_code(unsigned int vector)
> {
> static u32 exception_has_error_code = BIT(DF_VECTOR) | BIT(TS_VECTOR) |
> BIT(NP_VECTOR) | BIT(SS_VECTOR) | BIT(GP_VECTOR) |
> - BIT(PF_VECTOR) | BIT(AC_VECTOR);
> + BIT(PF_VECTOR) | BIT(AC_VECTOR) | BIT(CP_VECTOR);
>
> return (1U << vector) & exception_has_error_code;
> }
> @@ -298,7 +298,8 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr2,
> * Right now, no XSS states are used on x86 platform,
> * expand the macro for new features.

I assume this comment needs to be updated?

> */
> -#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS 0
> +#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER \
> + | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)
>
> extern u64 host_xcr0;
>
> --
> 2.17.2
>

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2019-12-10 22:01    [W:0.127 / U:1.452 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site