[lkml]   [2019]   [Nov]   [5]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
Subject[PATCH v15 2/9] namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution
/* Background. */
There has always been a special class of symlink-like objects in procfs
(and a few other pseudo-filesystems) which allow for non-lexical
resolution of paths using nd_jump_link(). These "magic-links" do not
follow traditional mount namespace boundaries, and have been used
consistently in container escape attacks because they can be used to
trick unsuspecting privileged processes into resolving unexpected paths.

It is also non-trivial for userspace to unambiguously avoid resolving
magic-links, because they do not have a reliable indication that they
are a magic-link (in order to verify them you'd have to manually open
the path given by readlink(2) and then verify that the two file
descriptors reference the same underlying file, which is plagued with
possible race conditions or supplementary attack scenarios).

It would therefore be very helpful for userspace to be able to avoid
these symlinks easily, thus hopefully removing a tool from attackers'

This is part of a refresh of Al's AT_NO_JUMPS patchset[1] (which was a
variation on David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[2], which in turn was
based on the Capsicum project[3]).

/* Userspace API. */
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS will be exposed to userspace through openat2(2).

/* Semantics. */
Unlike most other LOOKUP flags (most notably LOOKUP_FOLLOW),
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS applies to all components of the path.

With LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, any magic-link path component encountered
during path resolution will yield -ELOOP. The handling of ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW
for a trailing magic-link is identical to LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS.


/* Testing. */
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS is tested as part of the openat2(2) selftests.


Cc: Christian Brauner <>
Suggested-by: David Drysdale <>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <>
fs/namei.c | 7 ++++++-
include/linux/namei.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 4e85d6fa4048..1f0d871199e5 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ void nd_jump_link(struct path *path)

nd->path = *path;
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
- nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;

static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd)
@@ -1063,6 +1063,7 @@ const char *get_link(struct nameidata *nd)
return ERR_PTR(error);

nd->last_type = LAST_BIND;
res = READ_ONCE(inode->i_link);
if (!res) {
const char * (*get)(struct dentry *, struct inode *,
@@ -1078,6 +1079,10 @@ const char *get_link(struct nameidata *nd)
} else {
res = get(dentry, inode, &last->done);
+ if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED) {
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
+ }
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(res))
return res;
diff --git a/include/linux/namei.h b/include/linux/namei.h
index ee2e35af387f..a8b3f93338da 100644
--- a/include/linux/namei.h
+++ b/include/linux/namei.h
#define LOOKUP_JUMPED 0x1000
#define LOOKUP_ROOT 0x2000
#define LOOKUP_ROOT_GRABBED 0x0008

/* Scoping flags for lookup. */
#define LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS 0x020000 /* No symlink crossing. */
+#define LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS 0x040000 /* No /proc/$pid/fd/ "symlink" crossing. */

extern int path_pts(struct path *path);

 \ /
  Last update: 2019-11-05 10:08    [W:0.220 / U:6.780 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site