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SubjectRe: [PATCH 3/3] x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP
On Wed, Nov 13, 2019 at 4:19 PM Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 13, 2019 at 11:11 AM 'Dmitry Vyukov' via kasan-dev
> <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Nov 12, 2019 at 10:10 PM 'Jann Horn' via kasan-dev
> > <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Make #GP exceptions caused by out-of-bounds KASAN shadow accesses easier
> > > to understand by computing the address of the original access and
> > > printing that. More details are in the comments in the patch.
> > >
> > > This turns an error like this:
> > >
> > > kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
> > > kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
> > > traps: dereferencing non-canonical address 0xe017577ddf75b7dd
> > > general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
> > >
> > > into this:
> > >
> > > traps: dereferencing non-canonical address 0xe017577ddf75b7dd
> > > kasan: maybe dereferencing invalid pointer in range
> > > [0x00badbeefbadbee8-0x00badbeefbadbeef]
> > > general protection fault: 0000 [#3] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
> > > [...]
>
> Would it make sense to use the common "BUG: KASAN: <bug-type>" report
> format here? Something like:
>
> BUG: KASAN: invalid-ptr-deref in range ...


Currently this line is not the official bug title. The official bug
title is "general protection fault:" line that follows.
If we add "BUG: KASAN:" before that we need to be super careful wrt
effect on syzbot but parsing/reporting.



> Otherwise this looks amazing, distinguishing NULL pointer accesses
> from wild memory accesses is much more convenient with this. Thanks
> Jann!
>
> >
> > Nice!
> >
> > +Andrey, do you see any issues for TAGS mode? Or, Jann, did you test
> > it by any chance?
>
> Hm, this looks like x86-specific change, so I don't think it
> interferes with the TAGS mode.
>
> >
> >
> > > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> > > ---
> > > arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h | 6 +++++
> > > arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 ++
> > > arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> > > 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h
> > > index 13e70da38bed..eaf624a758ed 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kasan.h
> > > @@ -25,6 +25,12 @@
> > >
> > > #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> > >
> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
> > > +void kasan_general_protection_hook(unsigned long addr);
> > > +#else
> > > +static inline void kasan_general_protection_hook(unsigned long addr) { }
> > > +#endif
> > > +
> > > #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
> > > void __init kasan_early_init(void);
> > > void __init kasan_init(void);
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> > > index 479cfc6e9507..e271a5a1ddd4 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> > > @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
> > > #include <asm/umip.h>
> > > #include <asm/insn.h>
> > > #include <asm/insn-eval.h>
> > > +#include <asm/kasan.h>
> > >
> > > #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> > > #include <asm/x86_init.h>
> > > @@ -544,6 +545,7 @@ static void print_kernel_gp_address(struct pt_regs *regs)
> > > return;
> > >
> > > pr_alert("dereferencing non-canonical address 0x%016lx\n", addr_ref);
> > > + kasan_general_protection_hook(addr_ref);
> > > #endif
> > > }
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
> > > index 296da58f3013..9ef099309489 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
> > > @@ -246,20 +246,44 @@ static void __init kasan_map_early_shadow(pgd_t *pgd)
> > > }
> > >
> > > #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
> > > -static int kasan_die_handler(struct notifier_block *self,
> > > - unsigned long val,
> > > - void *data)
> > > +/*
> > > + * With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high
> > > + * canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads
> > > + * before the actual access. For addresses in the low canonical half of the
> > > + * address space, as well as most non-canonical addresses, that out-of-bounds
> > > + * shadow memory access lands in the non-canonical part of the address space,
> > > + * causing #GP to be thrown.
> > > + * Help the user figure out what the original bogus pointer was.
> > > + */
> > > +void kasan_general_protection_hook(unsigned long addr)
> > > {
> > > - if (val == DIE_GPF) {
> > > - pr_emerg("CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled\n");
> > > - pr_emerg("GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access\n");
> > > - }
> > > - return NOTIFY_OK;
> > > -}
> > > + unsigned long orig_addr;
> > > + const char *addr_type;
> > > +
> > > + if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
> > > + return;
> >
> > Thinking how much sense it makes to compare addr with KASAN_SHADOW_END...
> > If the addr is > KASAN_SHADOW_END, we know it's not a KASAN access,
> > but do we ever get GP on canonical addresses?
> >
> > >
> > > -static struct notifier_block kasan_die_notifier = {
> > > - .notifier_call = kasan_die_handler,
> > > -};
> > > + orig_addr = (addr - KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
> > > + /*
> > > + * For faults near the shadow address for NULL, we can be fairly certain
> > > + * that this is a KASAN shadow memory access.
> > > + * For faults that correspond to shadow for low canonical addresses, we
> > > + * can still be pretty sure - that shadow region is a fairly narrow
> > > + * chunk of the non-canonical address space.
> > > + * But faults that look like shadow for non-canonical addresses are a
> > > + * really large chunk of the address space. In that case, we still
> > > + * print the decoded address, but make it clear that this is not
> > > + * necessarily what's actually going on.
> > > + */
> > > + if (orig_addr < PAGE_SIZE)
> > > + addr_type = "dereferencing kernel NULL pointer";
> > > + else if (orig_addr < TASK_SIZE_MAX)
> > > + addr_type = "probably dereferencing invalid pointer";
> >
> > This is access to user memory, right? In outline mode we call it
> > "user-memory-access". We could say about "user" part here as well.
>
> I think we should use the same naming scheme here as in
> get_wild_bug_type(): null-ptr-deref, user-memory-access and
> wild-memory-access.
>
> >
> > > + else
> > > + addr_type = "maybe dereferencing invalid pointer";
> > > + pr_alert("%s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", addr_type,
> > > + orig_addr, orig_addr + (1 << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) - 1);
> >
> > "(1 << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) - 1)" part may be replaced with
> > KASAN_SHADOW_MASK.
> > Overall it can make sense to move this mm/kasan/report.c b/c we are
> > open-coding a number of things here (e.g. reverse address mapping). If
> > another arch will do the same, it will need all of this code too (?).
> >
> > But in general I think it's a very good usability improvement for KASAN.
> >
> > > +}
> > > #endif
> > >
> > > void __init kasan_early_init(void)
> > > @@ -298,10 +322,6 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
> > > int i;
> > > void *shadow_cpu_entry_begin, *shadow_cpu_entry_end;
> > >
> > > -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
> > > - register_die_notifier(&kasan_die_notifier);
> > > -#endif
> > > -
> > > memcpy(early_top_pgt, init_top_pgt, sizeof(early_top_pgt));
> > >
> > > /*
> > > --
> > > 2.24.0.432.g9d3f5f5b63-goog
> > >
> > > --
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> >
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