lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2019]   [Oct]   [4]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
/
SubjectRe: [PATCH] kasan: fix the missing underflow in memmove and memcpy with CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y
From
Date
On Fri, 2019-10-04 at 12:42 +0800, Walter Wu wrote:
> On Thu, 2019-10-03 at 16:53 +0200, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 3, 2019 at 3:51 PM Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> wrote:>
> > >
> > > static void print_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> > > {
> > > - pr_err("BUG: KASAN: %s in %pS\n",
> > > - get_bug_type(info), (void *)info->ip);
> > > - pr_err("%s of size %zu at addr %px by task %s/%d\n",
> > > - info->is_write ? "Write" : "Read", info->access_size,
> > > - info->access_addr, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
> > > + if ((long)info->access_size < 0) {
> > > + pr_err("BUG: KASAN: invalid size %zu in %pS\n",
> > > + info->access_size, (void *)info->ip);
> >
> > I would not introduce a new bug type.
> > These are parsed and used by some systems, e.g. syzbot. If size is
> > user-controllable, then a new bug type for this will mean 2 bug
> > reports.
> > It also won't harm to print Read/Write, definitely the address, so no
> > reason to special case this out of a dozen of report formats.
> > This can qualify as out-of-bounds (definitely will cross some
> > bounds!), so I would change get_bug_type() to return
> > "slab-out-of-bounds" (as the most common OOB) in such case (with a
> > comment).
> >
> Print Read/Write and address information, it is ok.
> But if we can directly point to the root cause of this problem, why we
> not do it? see 1) and 2) to get a point, if we print OOB, then user
> needs one minute to think what is root case of this problem, but if we
> print invalid size, then user can directly get root case. this is my
> original thinking.
> 1)Invalid size is true then OOB is true.
> 2)OOB is true then invalid size may be true or false.
>
> But I see you say some systems have used bug report so that avoid this
> trouble, i will print the wrong type is "out-of-bound" in a unified way
> when size<0.
>

Updated my patch, please help to review it.
thanks.

commit 13e10a7e4264eb25c5a14193068027afc9c261f6
Author: Walter-zh Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Date: Fri Oct 4 15:27:17 2019 +0800

kasan: detect negative size in memory operation function

It is an undefined behavior to pass a negative value to
memset()/memcpy()/memmove()
, so need to be detected by KASAN.

If size is negative value, then it will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
so that we will qualify as out-of-bounds issue.

KASAN report:

BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task
cat/72

CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted
5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288
show_stack+0x14/0x20
dump_stack+0x10c/0x164
print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378
__kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0
kasan_report+0xc/0x18
check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0
memmove+0x34/0x88
kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0

[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341

Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Reported -by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>

diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
index 49cc4d570a40..06942cf585cc 100644
--- a/lib/test_kasan.c
+++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
@@ -283,6 +283,23 @@ static noinline void __init
kmalloc_oob_in_memset(void)
kfree(ptr);
}

+static noinline void __init kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size(void)
+{
+ char *ptr;
+ size_t size = 64;
+
+ pr_info("invalid size in memmove\n");
+ ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ptr) {
+ pr_err("Allocation failed\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ memset((char *)ptr, 0, 64);
+ memmove((char *)ptr, (char *)ptr + 4, -2);
+ kfree(ptr);
+}
+
static noinline void __init kmalloc_uaf(void)
{
char *ptr;
@@ -773,6 +790,7 @@ static int __init kmalloc_tests_init(void)
kmalloc_oob_memset_4();
kmalloc_oob_memset_8();
kmalloc_oob_memset_16();
+ kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size();
kmalloc_uaf();
kmalloc_uaf_memset();
kmalloc_uaf2();
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 6814d6d6a023..97dd6eecc3e7 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write);
#undef memset
void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
{
- check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_);
+ if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_))
+ return NULL;

return __memset(addr, c, len);
}
@@ -110,7 +111,8 @@ void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
#undef memmove
void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
{
- check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
+ if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_))
+ return NULL;
check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);

return __memmove(dest, src, len);
@@ -119,7 +121,8 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t
len)
#undef memcpy
void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
{
- check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
+ if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_))
+ return NULL;
check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);

return __memcpy(dest, src, len);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
index 616f9dd82d12..02148a317d27 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ static __always_inline bool
check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr,
if (unlikely(size == 0))
return true;

+ if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) {
+ kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+ return false;
+ }
+
if (unlikely((void *)addr <
kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) {
kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
index 36c645939bc9..ae9596210394 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
@@ -107,6 +107,13 @@ static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct
kasan_access_info *info)

const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
{
+ /*
+ * if access_size < 0, then it will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
+ * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
+ */
+ if ((long)info->access_size < 0)
+ return "out-of-bounds";
+
if (addr_has_shadow(info->access_addr))
return get_shadow_bug_type(info);
return get_wild_bug_type(info);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c
index 0e987c9ca052..b829535a3ad7 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/tags.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c
@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t
size, bool write,
if (unlikely(size == 0))
return true;

+ if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) {
+ kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+ return false;
+ }
+
tag = get_tag((const void *)addr);

/*
diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
index 969ae08f59d7..1e1ca81214b5 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
@@ -36,6 +36,13 @@

const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
{
+ /*
+ * if access_size < 0, then it will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
+ * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
+ */
+ if ((long)info->access_size < 0)
+ return "out-of-bounds";
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
struct kmem_cache *cache;

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2019-10-04 10:02    [W:0.097 / U:30.748 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site