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SubjectRe: [PATCH] x86/mm: determine whether the fault address is canonical
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On 10/4/19 7:59 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> @@ -123,7 +125,8 @@ __visible bool ex_handler_uaccess(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
>> unsigned long error_code,
>> unsigned long fault_addr)
>> {
>> - WARN_ONCE(trapnr == X86_TRAP_GP, "General protection fault in user access. Non-canonical address?");
>> + WARN_ONCE(trapnr == X86_TRAP_GP, "General protection fault at %s address in user access.",
>> + is_canonical_addr(fault_addr) ? "canonical" : "non-canonical");
> Unless the hardware behaves rather differently from the way I think it
> does, fault_addr is garbage for anything other than #PF and sometimes
> for #DF. (And maybe the virtualization faults?) I don't believe that
> #GP fills in CR2.

For #GP, we do:

do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
...
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
if (fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_GP, error_code, 0))
return;

Where the 0 is 'fault_addr'. I'm not sure any other way that
ex_handler_uaccess() can get called with trapnr == X86_TRAP_GP. 0 is
canonical last I checked, which would make this patch a bit academic. :)

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