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SubjectRe: [PATCH v23 12/24] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
On Wed, Oct 30, 2019 at 09:45:05AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 10/28/19 5:03 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a set of CPU instructions that
> > can be used by applications to set aside private regions of code and
> > data. The code outside the SGX hosted software entity is disallowed to
> > access the memory inside the enclave enforced by the CPU. We call these
> > entities as enclaves.
> >
> > This commit implements a driver that provides an ioctl API to construct
> > and run enclaves. Enclaves are constructed from pages residing in
> > reserved physical memory areas. The contents of these pages can only be
> > accessed when they are mapped as part of an enclave, by a hardware
> > thread running inside the enclave.
> >
> > The starting state of an enclave consists of a fixed measured set of
> > pages that are copied to the EPC during the construction process by
> > using ENCLS leaf functions and Software Enclave Control Structure (SECS)
> > that defines the enclave properties.
> >
> > Enclave are constructed by using ENCLS leaf functions ECREATE, EADD and
> > EINIT. ECREATE initializes SECS, EADD copies pages from system memory to
> > the EPC and EINIT check a given signed measurement and moves the enclave
> > into a state ready for execution.
> >
> > An initialized enclave can only be accessed through special Thread Control
> > Structure (TCS) pages by using ENCLU (ring-3 only) leaf EENTER. This leaf
> > function converts a thread into enclave mode and continues the execution in
> > the offset defined by the TCS provided to EENTER. An enclave is exited
> > through syscall, exception, interrupts or by explicitly calling another
> > ENCLU leaf EEXIT.
> >
> > The permissions, which enclave page is added will set the limit for maximum
> > permissions that can be set for mmap() and mprotect(). This will
> > effectively allow to build different security schemes between producers and
> > consumers of enclaves. Later on we can increase granularity with LSM hooks
> > for page addition (i.e. for producers) and mapping of the enclave (i.e. for
> > consumers)
> Where do things stand wrt to ensuring that SGX cannot be used to introduce
> executable mappings that were never authorized by the LSM (or never measured
> by IMA)?

This was the latest discussion about that subject:


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