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SubjectRe: [PATCH v9 09/17] x86/split_lock: Handle #AC exception for split lock
On 16/10/19 13:49, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Wed, 16 Oct 2019, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> Yes it does. But Sean's proposal, as I understand it, leads to the
>> guest receiving #AC when it wasn't expecting one. So for an old guest,
>> as soon as the guest kernel happens to do a split lock, it gets an
>> unexpected #AC and crashes and burns. And then, after much googling and
>> gnashing of teeth, people proceed to disable split lock detection.
> I don't think that this was what he suggested/intended.

Xiaoyao's reply suggests that he also understood it like that.

>> In all of these cases, the common final result is that split-lock
>> detection is disabled on the host. So might as well go with the
>> simplest one and not pretend to virtualize something that (without core
>> scheduling) is obviously not virtualizable.
> You are completely ignoring any argument here and just leave it behind your
> signature (instead of trimming your reply).

I am not ignoring them, I think there is no doubt that this is the
intended behavior. I disagree that Sean's patches achieve it, however.

>>> 1) Sane guest
>>> Guest kernel has #AC handler and you basically prevent it from
>>> detecting malicious user space and killing it. You also prevent #AC
>>> detection in the guest kernel which limits debugability.
> That's a perfectly fine situation. Host has #AC enabled and exposes the
> availability of #AC to the guest. Guest kernel has a proper handler and
> does the right thing. So the host _CAN_ forward #AC to the guest and let it
> deal with it. For that to work you need to expose the MSR so you know the
> guest state in the host.
> Your lazy 'solution' just renders #AC completely useless even for
> debugging.
>>> 2) Malicious guest
>>> Trigger #AC to disable the host detection and then carry out the DoS
>>> attack.
> With your proposal you render #AC useless even on hosts which have SMT
> disabled, which is just wrong. There are enough good reasons to disable
> SMT.

My lazy "solution" only applies to SMT enabled. When SMT is either not
supported, or disabled as in "nosmt=force", we can virtualize it like
the posted patches have done so far.

> I agree that with SMT enabled the situation is truly bad, but we surely can
> be smarter than just disabling it globally unconditionally and forever.
> Plus we want a knob which treats guests triggering #AC in the same way as
> we treat user space, i.e. kill them with SIGBUS.

Yes, that's a valid alternative. But if SMT is possible, I think the
only sane possibilities are global disable and SIGBUS. SIGBUS (or
better, a new KVM_RUN exit code) can be acceptable for debugging guests too.


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