lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2019]   [Oct]   [16]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
SubjectRe: [PATCH v9 09/17] x86/split_lock: Handle #AC exception for split lock
From
Date
On 10/16/2019 6:16 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 16/10/19 11:47, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> On Wed, 16 Oct 2019, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>>> Just never advertise split-lock
>>> detection to guests. If the host has enabled split-lock detection,
>>> trap #AC and forward it to the host handler---which would disable
>>> split lock detection globally and reenter the guest.
>>
>> Which completely defeats the purpose.
>
> Yes it does. But Sean's proposal, as I understand it, leads to the
> guest receiving #AC when it wasn't expecting one. So for an old guest,
> as soon as the guest kernel happens to do a split lock, it gets an
> unexpected #AC and crashes and burns. And then, after much googling and
> gnashing of teeth, people proceed to disable split lock detection.
>
> (Old guests are the common case: you're a cloud provider and your
> customers run old stuff; it's a workstation and you want to play that
> game that requires an old version of Windows; etc.).
>
> To save them the googling and gnashing of teeth, I guess we can do a
> pr_warn_ratelimited on the first split lock encountered by a guest. (It
> has to be ratelimited because userspace could create an arbitrary amount
> of guests to spam the kernel logs). But the end result is the same,
> split lock detection is disabled by the user.
>
> The first alternative I thought of was:
>
> - Remove KVM loading of MSR_TEST_CTRL, i.e. KVM *never* writes the CPU's
> actual MSR_TEST_CTRL. KVM still emulates MSR_TEST_CTRL so that the
> guest can do WRMSR and handle its own #AC faults, but KVM doesn't
> change the value in hardware.
>
> - trap #AC if the guest encounters a split lock while detection is
> disabled, and then disable split-lock detection in the host.
>
> But I discarded it because it still doesn't do anything for malicious
> guests, which can trigger #AC as they prefer. And it makes things
> _worse_ for sane guests, because they think split-lock detection is
> enabled but they become vulnerable as soon as there is only one
> malicious guest on the same machine.
>
> In all of these cases, the common final result is that split-lock
> detection is disabled on the host. So might as well go with the
> simplest one and not pretend to virtualize something that (without core
> scheduling) is obviously not virtualizable.

Right, the nature of core-scope makes MSR_TEST_CTL impossible/hard to
virtualize.

- Making old guests survive needs to disable split-lock detection in
host(hardware).
- Defending malicious guests needs to enable split-lock detection in
host(hardware).

We cannot achieve them at the same time.

In my opinion, letting kvm disable the split-lock detection in host is
not acceptable that it just opens the door for malicious guests to
attack. I think we can use Sean's proposal like below.

KVM always traps #AC, and only advertises split-lock detection to guest
when the global variable split_lock_detection_enabled in host is true.

- If guest enables #AC (CPL3 alignment check or split-lock detection
enabled), injecting #AC back into guest since it's supposed capable of
handling it.
- If guest doesn't enable #AC, KVM reports #AC to userspace (like other
unexpected exceptions), and we can print a hint in kernel, or let
userspace (e.g., QEMU) tell the user guest is killed because there is a
split-lock in guest.

In this way, malicious guests always get killed by userspace and old
sane guests cannot survive as well if it causes split-lock. If we do
want old sane guests work we have to disable the split-lock detection
(through booting parameter or debugfs) in the host just the same as we
want to run an old and split-lock generating userspace binary.

But there is an issue that we advertise split-lock detection to guest
based on the value of split_lock_detection_enabled to be true in host,
which can be turned into false dynamically when split-lock happens in
host kernel. This causes guest's capability changes at run time and I
don't if there is a better way to inform guest? Maybe we need a pv
interface?

> Thanks,
>
> Paolo
>
>> 1) Sane guest
>>
>> Guest kernel has #AC handler and you basically prevent it from
>> detecting malicious user space and killing it. You also prevent #AC
>> detection in the guest kernel which limits debugability.
>>
>> 2) Malicious guest
>>
>> Trigger #AC to disable the host detection and then carry out the DoS
>> attack.
>
>

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2019-10-16 13:23    [W:0.114 / U:0.908 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site