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Subject[PATCH v3 6/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass
Date
Return status based on ssbd_state and the arm64 SSBS feature. If
the mitigation is disabled, or the firmware isn't responding then
return the expected machine state based on a new blacklist of known
vulnerable cores.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 48 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index ee286d606d9b..c8ff96158b94 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -288,6 +288,7 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);

int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL;
+static bool __ssb_safe = true;

static const struct ssbd_options {
const char *str;
@@ -385,10 +386,18 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
{
struct arm_smccc_res res;
bool required = true;
+ bool is_vul;
s32 val;

WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());

+ is_vul = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list);
+
+ if (is_vul)
+ __ssb_safe = false;
+
+ arm64_requested_vuln_attrs |= VULN_SSB;
+
if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) {
required = false;
goto out_printmsg;
@@ -422,6 +431,7 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
return false;

+ /* machines with mixed mitigation requirements must not return this */
case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc);
ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
@@ -476,6 +486,17 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,

return required;
}
+
+/* known vulnerable cores */
+static const struct midr_range arm64_ssb_cpus[] = {
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
+ MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76),
+ {},
+};
+
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */

static void __maybe_unused
@@ -762,6 +783,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
.capability = ARM64_SSBD,
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = has_ssbd_mitigation,
+ .midr_range_list = arm64_ssb_cpus,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873
@@ -809,4 +831,30 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
}

+ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ /*
+ * Two assumptions: First, get_ssbd_state() reflects the worse case
+ * for hetrogenous machines, and that if SSBS is supported its
+ * supported by all cores.
+ */
+ switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) {
+ case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED:
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+ case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
+ case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
+ if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+ return sprintf(buf,
+ "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled\n");
+ }
+
+ if (__ssb_safe)
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
#endif
--
2.17.2
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