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SubjectRe: KASAN: use-after-free Read in posix_lock_inode
On Wed, Jan 2, 2019 at 7:20 PM Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 2019-01-02 at 02:31 -0800, syzbot wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > syzbot found the following crash on:
> >
> > HEAD commit: e1ef035d272e Merge tag 'armsoc-defconfig' of git://git.ker..
> > git tree: upstream
> > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=16bb4c4b400000
> > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=9c6a26e22579190b
> > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=239d99847eb49ecb3899
> > compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental)
> > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=128aa377400000
> >
> > IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
> > Reported-by: syzbot+239d99847eb49ecb3899@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> >
> > IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): vxcan1: link is not ready
> > IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_UP): vxcan1: link is not ready
> > 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0
> > 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0
> > ==================================================================
> > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in what_owner_is_waiting_for fs/locks.c:1000
> > [inline]
> > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in posix_locks_deadlock fs/locks.c:1023 [inline]
> > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in posix_lock_inode+0x1f9e/0x2750 fs/locks.c:1163
> > Read of size 8 at addr ffff88808791b000 by task syz-executor2/10100
> >
> > CPU: 1 PID: 10100 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.20.0+ #3
> > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
> > Google 01/01/2011
> > Call Trace:
> > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
> > dump_stack+0x1db/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
> > print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187
> > kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317
> > __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135
> > what_owner_is_waiting_for fs/locks.c:1000 [inline]
> > posix_locks_deadlock fs/locks.c:1023 [inline]
> > posix_lock_inode+0x1f9e/0x2750 fs/locks.c:1163
> > posix_lock_file fs/locks.c:1346 [inline]
> > vfs_lock_file fs/locks.c:2314 [inline]
> > vfs_lock_file+0xc7/0xf0 fs/locks.c:2309
> > do_lock_file_wait.part.0+0xe5/0x260 fs/locks.c:2328
> > do_lock_file_wait fs/locks.c:2324 [inline]
> > fcntl_setlk+0x2f1/0xfe0 fs/locks.c:2413
> > do_fcntl+0x843/0x12b0 fs/fcntl.c:370
> > __do_sys_fcntl fs/fcntl.c:463 [inline]
> > __se_sys_fcntl fs/fcntl.c:448 [inline]
> > __x64_sys_fcntl+0x16d/0x1e0 fs/fcntl.c:448
> > do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
> > RIP: 0033:0x457ec9
> > Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7
> > 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
> > ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
> > RSP: 002b:00007f58bbb50c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000048
> > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457ec9
> > RDX: 0000000020000140 RSI: 0000000000000007 RDI: 0000000000000003
> > RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f58bbb516d4
> > R13: 00000000004be5f0 R14: 00000000004ceab0 R15: 00000000ffffffff
> >
> > Allocated by task 10100:
> > save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:73
> > set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
> > kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:482 [inline]
> > kasan_kmalloc+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:455
> > kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:397
> > kmem_cache_alloc+0x12d/0x710 mm/slab.c:3541
> > kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:730 [inline]
> > locks_alloc_lock+0x8e/0x2f0 fs/locks.c:344
> > fcntl_setlk+0xa9/0xfe0 fs/locks.c:2362
> > do_fcntl+0x843/0x12b0 fs/fcntl.c:370
> > __do_sys_fcntl fs/fcntl.c:463 [inline]
> > __se_sys_fcntl fs/fcntl.c:448 [inline]
> > __x64_sys_fcntl+0x16d/0x1e0 fs/fcntl.c:448
> > do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
> >
> > Freed by task 10100:
> > save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:73
> > set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
> > __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:444
> > kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:452
> > __cache_free mm/slab.c:3485 [inline]
> > kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3747
> > locks_free_lock+0x27a/0x3f0 fs/locks.c:381
> > fcntl_setlk+0x7b5/0xfe0 fs/locks.c:2439
> > do_fcntl+0x843/0x12b0 fs/fcntl.c:370
> > __do_sys_fcntl fs/fcntl.c:463 [inline]
> > __se_sys_fcntl fs/fcntl.c:448 [inline]
> > __x64_sys_fcntl+0x16d/0x1e0 fs/fcntl.c:448
> > do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
> >
> > The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808791b000
> > which belongs to the cache file_lock_cache of size 264
> > The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
> > 264-byte region [ffff88808791b000, ffff88808791b108)
> > The buggy address belongs to the page:
> > page:ffffea00021e46c0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa16a1c0 index:0x0
> > flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab)
> > raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea0002333508 ffffea00021d76c8 ffff8880aa16a1c0
> > raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88808791b000 000000010000000c 0000000000000000
> > page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> >
> > Memory state around the buggy address:
> > ffff88808791af00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > ffff88808791af80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > > ffff88808791b000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> > ^
> > ffff88808791b080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> > ffff88808791b100: fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> > ==================================================================
> >
> >
>
> I've given this a harder look and I really don't quite grok what
> this output is telling me:
>
> All 3 stack traces say they come from PID 10100, but the use-after-free
> seems to occur well before the free could have occurred in the context
> of the current fcntl call.

Interestingly it is the case in all crashes for this bug. It may be
something inherent, or maybe just the particular program that
triggered this is such that these accesses happen in the same thread.

> So, I guess that leaves the possibility that we freed a lock request
> from an earlier fcntl call without removing it properly from the tree,
> but (a) I don't see how that could happen, _and_ (b) why didn't that
> trip the BUG_ONs in locks_free_lock?
>
> I'll keep looking at this, but I'm a bit stumped at the moment.

The simplest repro for this is:

# See https://goo.gl/kgGztJ for information about syzkaller reproducers.
#{"threaded":true,"collide":true,"repeat":true,"procs":6,"sandbox":"none","fault_call":-1,"tun":true,"tmpdir":true,"cgroups":true,"netdev":true,"resetnet":true,"segv":true}
r0 = epoll_create1(0x0)
fcntl$lock(r0, 0x7, &(0x7f0000000080))
fcntl$lock(r0, 0x7, &(0x7f0000000140)={0x1000000000001, 0x0, 0x1000000})

"collide":true means that the 2 fcntl's were executed in parallel. But
still the alloc/free/access always happened in the same thread, so the
thread interaction seems to be somewhat unusual.

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