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SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries
Hi,

> Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> hat am 15. Januar 2019 um 22:21 geschrieben:
>
>
> Hi,
>
> On 01/15/2019 01:50 PM, Stefan Wahren wrote:
> > Hi Jeremy,
> >
> >> Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> hat am 10. Januar 2019 um 00:55 geschrieben:
> >>
> >>
> >> Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable
> >> vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in
> >> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
> >>
> >> This series enables that behavior by providing the expected
> >> functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature
> >> states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately
> >> to display the overall machine status. This means that in a
> >> heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated
> >> or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or
> >> mitigated.
> >>
> >
> > i applied this v3 series and Marc's v2 series.
> >
> > Now i'm getting the following on a Raspberry Pi 3 B+ :
> >
> > meltdown:Not affected
> > spec_store_bypass:Not affected
> > spectre_v1:Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization
> >
> > So the entries l1tf and spectre_v2 disappeared.
>
> Yes, the l1tf entry should be gone.
>
> I believe there is a problem with the "1/2 advertise.." patch in that
> the 'arm64_requested_vuln_attrs |=' line needs to be hoisted to the top
> of check_branch_predictor() and the '__spectrev2_safe = false' line
> needs to be hoisted 6 lines immediately above "/* Fallback to firmware
> detection*/"

a snippet or a new version would be nice

>
> That should re-enable the spectre_v2 entry.

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