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SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 0/2] let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image
On 01/17/19 at 08:08pm, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Wed, 2019-01-16 at 18:16 +0800, Kairui Song wrote:
> > This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the
> > reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform
> > keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could
> > use this keyring as well.
>
> Remove "other component could use ...".
> >
> > This patch series also let kexec_file_load use platform keyring as fall
> > back if it failed to verify the image against secondary keyring, make it
> > possible to load kernel signed by third part key if third party key is
> > imported in the firmware.
>
> This is the only reason for these patches.  Please remove "also".
>
> >
> > After this patch kexec_file_load will be able to verify a signed PE
> > bzImage using keys in platform keyring.
> >
> > Tested in a VM with locally signed kernel with pesign and imported the
> > cert to EFI's MokList variable.
>
> It's taken so long for me to review/test this patch set due to a
> regression in sanity_check_segment_list(), introduced somewhere
> between 4.20 and 5.0.0-rc1.  The sgement overlap test - "if ((mend >
> pstart) && (mstart < pend))" - fails, returning a -EINVAL.
>
> Is anyone else seeing this?

Mimi, should be this issue? I have sent a fix for that.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181228011247.GA9999@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com/

Thanks
Dave

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