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SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 6/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass
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On 09/01/2019 23:55, Jeremy Linton wrote:
> Return status based on ssbd_state and the arm64 SSBS feature. If
> the mitigation is disabled, or the firmware isn't responding then
> return the expected machine state based on a new blacklist of known
> vulnerable cores.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> index ee286d606d9b..c8ff96158b94 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> @@ -288,6 +288,7 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
> DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
>
> int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL;
> +static bool __ssb_safe = true;
>
> static const struct ssbd_options {
> const char *str;
> @@ -385,10 +386,18 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> {
> struct arm_smccc_res res;
> bool required = true;
> + bool is_vul;
> s32 val;
>
> WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
>
> + is_vul = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list);
> +
> + if (is_vul)
> + __ssb_safe = false;
> +
> + arm64_requested_vuln_attrs |= VULN_SSB;
> +
> if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) {
> required = false;
> goto out_printmsg;
> @@ -422,6 +431,7 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
> return false;
>
> + /* machines with mixed mitigation requirements must not return this */
> case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
> pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc);
> ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
> @@ -476,6 +486,17 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>
> return required;
> }
> +
> +/* known vulnerable cores */
> +static const struct midr_range arm64_ssb_cpus[] = {
> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
> + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76),
> + {},
> +};
> +
> #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
>
> static void __maybe_unused
> @@ -762,6 +783,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
> .capability = ARM64_SSBD,
> .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
> .matches = has_ssbd_mitigation,
> + .midr_range_list = arm64_ssb_cpus,
> },
> #endif
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873
> @@ -809,4 +831,30 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
> return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
> }
>
> +ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
> + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Two assumptions: First, get_ssbd_state() reflects the worse case
> + * for hetrogenous machines, and that if SSBS is supported its
> + * supported by all cores.
> + */
> + switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) {
> + case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED:
> + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
> +
> + case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
> + case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
> + if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
> + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
> + return sprintf(buf,
> + "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled\n");
> + }
> +
> + if (__ssb_safe)
> + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");

The kbuild robot reports that this fails if CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD is not
selected. What should we print in this case? "Vulnerable"? Or "Unknown"?

> +
> + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
> +}
> +
> #endif
>

Thanks,

M.
--
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...

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