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Subject[PATCH 4.4 15/88] ipv4: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.


From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <>

[ Upstream commit 5648451e30a0d13d11796574919a359025d52cce ]

vr.vifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1616 ipmr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap)
net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1690 ipmr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing vr.vifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table'

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].


Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <>
net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <net/fib_rules.h>
#include <linux/netconf.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>

#if defined(CONFIG_IP_PIMSM_V1) || defined(CONFIG_IP_PIMSM_V2)
@@ -1574,6 +1575,7 @@ int ipmr_compat_ioctl(struct sock *sk, u
return -EFAULT;
if (vr.vifi >= mrt->maxvif)
return -EINVAL;
+ vr.vifi = array_index_nospec(vr.vifi, mrt->maxvif);
vif = &mrt->vif_table[vr.vifi];
if (VIF_EXISTS(mrt, vr.vifi)) {

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