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Subject[patch V2 02/10] x86/mm/cpa: Rework static_protections()
static_protections() is pretty unreadable. Split it up into separate checks
for each protection area.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
---
arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 159 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -286,84 +286,115 @@ static void cpa_flush_array(unsigned lon
}
}

+#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_BIOS
/*
- * Certain areas of memory on x86 require very specific protection flags,
- * for example the BIOS area or kernel text. Callers don't always get this
- * right (again, ioremap() on BIOS memory is not uncommon) so this function
- * checks and fixes these known static required protection bits.
+ * The BIOS area between 640k and 1Mb needs to be executable for PCI BIOS
+ * based config access (CONFIG_PCI_GOBIOS) support.
*/
-static inline pgprot_t static_protections(pgprot_t prot, unsigned long address,
- unsigned long pfn)
-{
- pgprot_t forbidden = __pgprot(0);
+#define BIOS_PFN PFN_DOWN(BIOS_BEGIN)
+#define BIOS_PFN_END PFN_DOWN(BIOS_END)

- /*
- * The BIOS area between 640k and 1Mb needs to be executable for
- * PCI BIOS based config access (CONFIG_PCI_GOBIOS) support.
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_BIOS
- if (pcibios_enabled && within(pfn, BIOS_BEGIN >> PAGE_SHIFT, BIOS_END >> PAGE_SHIFT))
- pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_NX;
+static pgprotval_t protect_pci_bios(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ if (pcibios_enabled && within(pfn, BIOS_PFN, BIOS_PFN_END))
+ return _PAGE_NX;
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+static pgprotval_t protect_pci_bios(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif

- /*
- * The kernel text needs to be executable for obvious reasons
- * Does not cover __inittext since that is gone later on. On
- * 64bit we do not enforce !NX on the low mapping
- */
- if (within(address, (unsigned long)_text, (unsigned long)_etext))
- pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_NX;
+/*
+ * The .rodata section needs to be read-only. Using the pfn catches all
+ * aliases. This also includes __ro_after_init, so do not enforce until
+ * kernel_set_to_readonly is true.
+ */
+static pgprotval_t protect_rodata(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ unsigned long start_pfn = __pa_symbol(__start_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ unsigned long end_pfn = __pa_symbol(__end_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT;

- /*
- * The .rodata section needs to be read-only. Using the pfn
- * catches all aliases. This also includes __ro_after_init,
- * so do not enforce until kernel_set_to_readonly is true.
- */
- if (kernel_set_to_readonly &&
- within(pfn, __pa_symbol(__start_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
- __pa_symbol(__end_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
- pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW;
+ if (kernel_set_to_readonly && within(pfn, start_pfn, end_pfn))
+ return _PAGE_RW;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The kernel text needs to be executable for obvious reasons. This does
+ * not cover __inittext since that is gone after boot. On 64bit we do not
+ * enforce !NX on the low mapping
+ */
+static pgprotval_t protect_kernel_text(unsigned long address)
+{
+ if (within(address, (unsigned long)_text, (unsigned long)_etext))
+ return _PAGE_NX;
+ return 0;
+}

#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
+/*
+ * Once the kernel maps the text as RO (kernel_set_to_readonly is set),
+ * kernel text mappings for the large page aligned text, rodata sections
+ * will be always read-only. For the kernel identity mappings covering the
+ * holes caused by this alignment can be anything that user asks.
+ *
+ * This will preserve the large page mappings for kernel text/data at no
+ * extra cost.
+ */
+static pgprotval_t protect_kernel_text_ro(unsigned long address)
+{
+ unsigned long end = (unsigned long)__end_rodata_hpage_align;
+ unsigned long start = (unsigned long)_text;
+ unsigned int level;
+
+ if (!kernel_set_to_readonly || !within(address, start, end))
+ return 0;
/*
- * Once the kernel maps the text as RO (kernel_set_to_readonly is set),
- * kernel text mappings for the large page aligned text, rodata sections
- * will be always read-only. For the kernel identity mappings covering
- * the holes caused by this alignment can be anything that user asks.
+ * Don't enforce the !RW mapping for the kernel text mapping, if
+ * the current mapping is already using small page mapping. No
+ * need to work hard to preserve large page mappings in this case.
*
- * This will preserve the large page mappings for kernel text/data
- * at no extra cost.
+ * This also fixes the Linux Xen paravirt guest boot failure caused
+ * by unexpected read-only mappings for kernel identity
+ * mappings. In this paravirt guest case, the kernel text mapping
+ * and the kernel identity mapping share the same page-table pages,
+ * so the protections for kernel text and identity mappings have to
+ * be the same.
*/
- if (kernel_set_to_readonly &&
- within(address, (unsigned long)_text,
- (unsigned long)__end_rodata_hpage_align)) {
- unsigned int level;
-
- /*
- * Don't enforce the !RW mapping for the kernel text mapping,
- * if the current mapping is already using small page mapping.
- * No need to work hard to preserve large page mappings in this
- * case.
- *
- * This also fixes the Linux Xen paravirt guest boot failure
- * (because of unexpected read-only mappings for kernel identity
- * mappings). In this paravirt guest case, the kernel text
- * mapping and the kernel identity mapping share the same
- * page-table pages. Thus we can't really use different
- * protections for the kernel text and identity mappings. Also,
- * these shared mappings are made of small page mappings.
- * Thus this don't enforce !RW mapping for small page kernel
- * text mapping logic will help Linux Xen parvirt guest boot
- * as well.
- */
- if (lookup_address(address, &level) && (level != PG_LEVEL_4K))
- pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW;
- }
+ if (lookup_address(address, &level) && (level != PG_LEVEL_4K))
+ return _PAGE_RW;
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+static pgprotval_t protect_kernel_text_ro(unsigned long address)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif

- prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) & ~pgprot_val(forbidden));
+/*
+ * Certain areas of memory on x86 require very specific protection flags,
+ * for example the BIOS area or kernel text. Callers don't always get this
+ * right (again, ioremap() on BIOS memory is not uncommon) so this function
+ * checks and fixes these known static required protection bits.
+ */
+static inline pgprot_t static_protections(pgprot_t prot, unsigned long address,
+ unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ pgprotval_t forbidden;
+
+ /* Operate on the virtual address */
+ forbidden = protect_kernel_text(address);
+ forbidden |= protect_kernel_text_ro(address);
+
+ /* Check the PFN directly */
+ forbidden |= protect_pci_bios(pfn);
+ forbidden |= protect_rodata(pfn);

- return prot;
+ return __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) & ~forbidden);
}

/*

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