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SubjectRe: KASAN: use-after-free Read in fuse_dev_do_read
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 10:51 AM, Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 13.09.2018 11:00, syzbot wrote:
>> Hello,
>>
>> syzbot found the following crash on:
>>
>> HEAD commit: 54eda9df17f3 Merge tag 'pci-v4.19-fixes-1' of git://git.ke..
>> git tree: upstream
>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=109a3d9e400000
>
> what are requests id written here:
>
> write$FUSE_INIT(r0, &(0x7f0000000100)={0x50, 0x0, 0x1}, 0x50)
> write$FUSE_STATFS(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)={0x60, 0x0, 0x2, {{0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xfffffffffffffffa}}}, 0x60)
>
> ?

Hi Kirill,

It may be easier to contrast these numbers with struct definitions here:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/sys/linux/fuse.txt

But passing this fragment through syskaller's tools/syz-prog2c gives
me the following (exact binary layout:

int main(void)
{
syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000, 0x1000000, 3, 0x32, -1, 0);

*(uint32_t*)0x20000100 = 0x50;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000104 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000108 = 1;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000110 = 7;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000114 = 0x1b;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000118 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000011c = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000120 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000122 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000124 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000128 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000012c = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000130 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000134 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000138 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000013c = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000140 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000144 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000148 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000014c = 0;
syscall(__NR_write, -1, 0x20000100, 0x50);
*(uint32_t*)0x20000040 = 0x60;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000044 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000048 = 2;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000050 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000058 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000060 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000068 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000070 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000078 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000007c = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000080 = 0xfffffffa;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000084 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000088 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000008c = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000090 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000094 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000098 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000009c = 0;
syscall(__NR_write, -1, 0x20000040, 0x60);
return 0;
}


For request IDs syzkaller just chooses random numbers in 1:8 range:

type fuse_out[PAYLOAD] {
len len[parent, int32]
err flags[fuse_errors, int32]
unique fuse_unique
payload PAYLOAD
} [packed]

type fuse_unique int64[1:8]


> In case of parallel thread called write with id, we just queued to processing
> in fuse_dev_do_read(), we may bump to this stack (despite read has not finished
> yet, syzbot may write just everything, any id).
>
> fuse_dev_do_read() fuse_dev_do_write()
> list_move_tail(&req->list, &fpq->processing); ...
> spin_unlock(&fpq->lock); ...
> ... request_end(fc, req);
> ... fuse_put_request(fc, req);
> if (test_bit(FR_INTERRUPTED, &req->flags))
> queue_interrupt(fiq, req);
>
> We should keep req refcount in fuse_dev_do_read(), till we haven't finished to use it.
> Something like this (compile tested only):
>
> diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c
> index 11ea2c4a38ab..675caed3e655 100644
> --- a/fs/fuse/dev.c
> +++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c
> @@ -1311,12 +1311,14 @@ static ssize_t fuse_dev_do_read(struct fuse_dev *fud, struct file *file,
> goto out_end;
> }
> list_move_tail(&req->list, &fpq->processing);
> + __fuse_get_request(req);
> spin_unlock(&fpq->lock);
> set_bit(FR_SENT, &req->flags);
> /* matches barrier in request_wait_answer() */
> smp_mb__after_atomic();
> if (test_bit(FR_INTERRUPTED, &req->flags))
> queue_interrupt(fiq, req);
> + fuse_put_request(fc, req);
>
> return reqsize;
>
>
>
>> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=b8f349d23d3c4835
>> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e975615ca01f2277bdd
>> compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)
>>
>> Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet.
>>
>> IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
>> Reported-by: syzbot+4e975615ca01f2277bdd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>>
>> ==================================================================
>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in constant_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:328 [inline]
>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fuse_dev_do_read.isra.27+0x1659/0x1920 fs/fuse/dev.c:1318
>> Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801cbd4ea30 by task syz-executor0/28821
>>
>> CPU: 1 PID: 28821 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3+ #11
>> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
>> Call Trace:
>> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
>> dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
>> print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256
>> kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
>> kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412
>> __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433
>> constant_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:328 [inline]
>> fuse_dev_do_read.isra.27+0x1659/0x1920 fs/fuse/dev.c:1318
>> fuse_dev_read+0x1a9/0x250 fs/fuse/dev.c:1360
>> call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:1801 [inline]
>> new_sync_read fs/read_write.c:406 [inline]
>> __vfs_read+0x6ac/0x9b0 fs/read_write.c:418
>> vfs_read+0x17f/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:452
>> ksys_read+0x101/0x260 fs/read_write.c:578
>> __do_sys_read fs/read_write.c:588 [inline]
>> __se_sys_read fs/read_write.c:586 [inline]
>> __x64_sys_read+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:586
>> do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
>> RIP: 0033:0x4572d9
>> Code: fd b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
>> RSP: 002b:00007faaeefe4c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
>> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007faaeefe56d4 RCX: 00000000004572d9
>> RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00000000200040c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
>> RBP: 00000000009300a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
>> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
>> R13: 00000000004d4508 R14: 00000000004c8d44 R15: 0000000000000000
>>
>> Allocated by task 28825:
>> save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
>> set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
>> kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
>> kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
>> kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x730 mm/slab.c:3554
>> __fuse_request_alloc+0x27/0xf0 fs/fuse/dev.c:58
>> fuse_request_alloc fs/fuse/dev.c:89 [inline]
>> __fuse_get_req+0x1f7/0x9e0 fs/fuse/dev.c:164
>> fuse_get_req fs/fuse/dev.c:194 [inline]
>> fuse_simple_request+0x28/0x730 fs/fuse/dev.c:549
>> fuse_statfs+0x368/0x8a0 fs/fuse/inode.c:442
>> statfs_by_dentry+0x136/0x210 fs/statfs.c:64
>> vfs_statfs+0x47/0x2e0 fs/statfs.c:74
>> user_statfs+0xbd/0x150 fs/statfs.c:89
>> __do_sys_statfs+0x7f/0xf0 fs/statfs.c:179
>> __se_sys_statfs fs/statfs.c:176 [inline]
>> __x64_sys_statfs+0x54/0x80 fs/statfs.c:176
>> do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
>>
>> Freed by task 28825:
>> save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
>> set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
>> __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
>> kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
>> __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
>> kmem_cache_free+0x83/0x290 mm/slab.c:3756
>> fuse_request_free+0x8b/0xa0 fs/fuse/dev.c:104
>> fuse_put_request+0x2a6/0x350 fs/fuse/dev.c:304
>> fuse_simple_request+0x453/0x730 fs/fuse/dev.c:571
>> fuse_statfs+0x368/0x8a0 fs/fuse/inode.c:442
>> statfs_by_dentry+0x136/0x210 fs/statfs.c:64
>> vfs_statfs+0x47/0x2e0 fs/statfs.c:74
>> user_statfs+0xbd/0x150 fs/statfs.c:89
>> __do_sys_statfs+0x7f/0xf0 fs/statfs.c:179
>> __se_sys_statfs fs/statfs.c:176 [inline]
>> __x64_sys_statfs+0x54/0x80 fs/statfs.c:176
>> do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
>>
>> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801cbd4ea00
>> which belongs to the cache fuse_request of size 448
>> The buggy address is located 48 bytes inside of
>> 448-byte region [ffff8801cbd4ea00, ffff8801cbd4ebc0)
>> The buggy address belongs to the page:
>> page:ffffea00072f5380 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801d4ad4840 index:0x0
>> flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab)
>> raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffffea000717eb48 ffff8801d4ad5c48 ffff8801d4ad4840
>> raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8801cbd4e000 0000000100000008 0000000000000000
>> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
>>
>> Memory state around the buggy address:
>> ffff8801cbd4e900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>> ffff8801cbd4e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>>> ffff8801cbd4ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>> ^
>> ffff8801cbd4ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>> ffff8801cbd4eb00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>> ==================================================================
>>
>>
>> ---
>> This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
>> See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
>> syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
>>
>> syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See:
>> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bug-status-tracking for how to communicate with syzbot.
>
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