lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2018]   [Aug]   [7]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
From
Date
SubjectRe: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption
On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 3:33 PM Yu Chen <yu.c.chen@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Aug 06, 2018 at 12:20:20PM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote:
> > On Mo, 2018-08-06 at 15:57 +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> > > Hi Oliver,
> > > On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 09:30:46AM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote:
> > > > On Di, 2018-07-24 at 00:23 +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > Good point, we once tried to generate key in kernel, but people
> > > > > suggest to generate key in userspace and provide it to the
> > > > > kernel, which is what ecryptfs do currently, so it seems this
> > > > > should also be safe for encryption in kernel.
> > > > > https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg33145.html
> > > > > Thus Chun-Yi's signature can use EFI key and both the key from
> > > > > user space.
> > > >
> > > > Hi,
> > > >
> > > > ecryptfs can trust user space. It is supposed to keep data
> > > > safe while the system is inoperative.
> > >
> > > Humm, I did not quite get the point here, let's take fscrypt
> >
> > While the system is running and the fs is mounted, your data
> > is as secure as root access to your machine, right? You encrypt
> > a disk primarily so data cannot be recovered (and altered) while
> > the system is not running.
> >
> > Secure Boot does not trust root fully. There is a cryptographic
> > chain of trust and user space is not part of it.
> >
> Okay, I see. So if we want to use secure boot mechanism for
> hibernation encryption, user space is trusted.
s/ is trusted/is not trusted/

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2018-08-07 09:44    [W:0.089 / U:2.892 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site