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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH v3 05/24] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
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On Thu, 2018-08-30 at 22:39 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Hi!
>
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > index 9871e649ffef..b090787188b4 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > @@ -2764,6 +2764,12 @@
> >   noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings
> > (default)
> >   noexec=off: disable non-executable
> > mappings
> >  
> > + no_cet_ibt [X86-64] Disable indirect branch
> > tracking for user-mode
> > + applications
> > +
> > + no_cet_shstk [X86-64] Disable shadow stack support
> > for user-mode
> > + applications
> Hmm, not too consistent with "nosmap" below. Would it make sense to
> have cet=on/off/ibt/shstk instead?
>
> >
> > +++ b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
> > @@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
> > +=========================================
> > +Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
> > +=========================================
> > +
> > +[1] Overview
> > +============
> > +
> > +Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) provides protection
> > against
> > +return/jump-oriented programing (ROP) attacks.
> Can you add something like "It attempts to protect process from
> running arbitrary code even after attacker has control of its stack"
> -- for people that don't know what ROP is, and perhaps link to
> wikipedia explaining ROP or something...
>
> >
> > It can be implemented
> > +to protect both the kernel and applications.  In the first phase,
> > +only the user-mode protection is implemented for the 64-bit
> > kernel.
> > +Thirty-two bit applications are supported under the compatibility
> 32-bit (for consistency).
>
> Ok, so CET stops execution of malicious code before architectural
> effects are visible, correct? Does it prevent micro-architectural
> effects of the malicious code? (cache content would be one example;
> see Spectre).
>
> >
> > +[3] Application Enabling
> > +========================
> "Enabling CET in applications" ?
>
> >
> > +Signal
> > +------
> > +
> > +The main program and its signal handlers use the same
> > SHSTK.  Because
> > +the SHSTK stores only return addresses, we can estimate a large
> > +enough SHSTK to cover the condition that both the program stack
> > and
> > +the sigaltstack run out.
> English? Is it estimate or is it large enough? "a large" -- "a"
> should
> be deleted AFAICT.
>  

I will work on these, thanks!

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