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SubjectRe: linux-next: manual merge of the audit tree with the selinux tree
On 2018-05-15 13:06, Stephen Rothwell wrote:
> Hi Paul,
>
> Today's linux-next merge of the audit tree got a conflict in:
>
> security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
>
> between commit:
>
> 4195ed425d3c ("audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record")
>
> from the selinux tree and commits:
>
> cdfb6b341f0f ("audit: use inline function to get audit context")
> d141136f523a ("audit: normalize MAC_POLICY_LOAD record")
>
> from the audit tree.
>
> I fixed it up (see below) and can carry the fix as necessary. This
> is now fixed as far as linux-next is concerned, but any non trivial
> conflicts should be mentioned to your upstream maintainer when your tree
> is submitted for merging. You may also want to consider cooperating
> with the maintainer of the conflicting tree to minimise any particularly
> complex conflicts.

This was expected... It looks ok.

> --
> Cheers,
> Stephen Rothwell
>
> diff --cc security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> index c0cadbc5f85c,35fd77737c59..000000000000
> --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> @@@ -167,13 -167,11 +167,13 @@@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struc
> NULL);
> if (length)
> goto out;
> - audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
> + audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
> - "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
> + "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
> + " enabled=%d old-enabled=%d lsm=selinux res=1",
> new_value, old_value,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
> - audit_get_sessionid(current));
> + audit_get_sessionid(current),
> + selinux_enabled, selinux_enabled);
> enforcing_set(state, new_value);
> if (new_value)
> avc_ss_reset(state->avc, 0);
> @@@ -303,12 -299,10 +303,12 @@@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struc
> length = selinux_disable(fsi->state);
> if (length)
> goto out;
> - audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
> + audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
> - "selinux=0 auid=%u ses=%u",
> + "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u"
> + " enabled=%d old-enabled=%d lsm=selinux res=1",
> + enforcing, enforcing,
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
> - audit_get_sessionid(current));
> + audit_get_sessionid(current), 0, 1);
> }
>
> length = count;
> @@@ -581,8 -575,8 +581,8 @@@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct fi
> length = count;
>
> out1:
> - audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
> + audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
> - "policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u",
> + "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1",
> from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
> audit_get_sessionid(current));
> out:



- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635

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