[lkml]   [2018]   [Apr]   [8]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
SubjectRe: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock programs per process hierarchy

On 02/27/2018 10:48 PM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> On 27/02/2018 17:39, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 5:32 AM, Alexei Starovoitov
>> <> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 05:20:55AM +0000, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 4:54 AM, Alexei Starovoitov
>>>> <> wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 04:40:34AM +0000, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 2:08 AM, Alexei Starovoitov
>>>>>> <> wrote:
>>>>>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 01:41:15AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>>>>>> The seccomp(2) syscall can be used by a task to apply a Landlock program
>>>>>>>> to itself. As a seccomp filter, a Landlock program is enforced for the
>>>>>>>> current task and all its future children. A program is immutable and a
>>>>>>>> task can only add new restricting programs to itself, forming a list of
>>>>>>>> programss.
>>>>>>>> A Landlock program is tied to a Landlock hook. If the action on a kernel
>>>>>>>> object is allowed by the other Linux security mechanisms (e.g. DAC,
>>>>>>>> capabilities, other LSM), then a Landlock hook related to this kind of
>>>>>>>> object is triggered. The list of programs for this hook is then
>>>>>>>> evaluated. Each program return a 32-bit value which can deny the action
>>>>>>>> on a kernel object with a non-zero value. If every programs of the list
>>>>>>>> return zero, then the action on the object is allowed.
>>>>>>>> Multiple Landlock programs can be chained to share a 64-bits value for a
>>>>>>>> call chain (e.g. evaluating multiple elements of a file path). This
>>>>>>>> chaining is restricted when a process construct this chain by loading a
>>>>>>>> program, but additional checks are performed when it requests to apply
>>>>>>>> this chain of programs to itself. The restrictions ensure that it is
>>>>>>>> not possible to call multiple programs in a way that would imply to
>>>>>>>> handle multiple shared values (i.e. cookies) for one chain. For now,
>>>>>>>> only a fs_pick program can be chained to the same type of program,
>>>>>>>> because it may make sense if they have different triggers (cf. next
>>>>>>>> commits). This restrictions still allows to reuse Landlock programs in
>>>>>>>> a safe way (e.g. use the same loaded fs_walk program with multiple
>>>>>>>> chains of fs_pick programs).
>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <>
>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>> +struct landlock_prog_set *landlock_prepend_prog(
>>>>>>>> + struct landlock_prog_set *current_prog_set,
>>>>>>>> + struct bpf_prog *prog)
>>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>>> + struct landlock_prog_set *new_prog_set = current_prog_set;
>>>>>>>> + unsigned long pages;
>>>>>>>> + int err;
>>>>>>>> + size_t i;
>>>>>>>> + struct landlock_prog_set tmp_prog_set = {};
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK_HOOK)
>>>>>>>> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + /* validate memory size allocation */
>>>>>>>> + pages = prog->pages;
>>>>>>>> + if (current_prog_set) {
>>>>>>>> + size_t i;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(current_prog_set->programs); i++) {
>>>>>>>> + struct landlock_prog_list *walker_p;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + for (walker_p = current_prog_set->programs[i];
>>>>>>>> + walker_p; walker_p = walker_p->prev)
>>>>>>>> + pages += walker_p->prog->pages;
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> + /* count a struct landlock_prog_set if we need to allocate one */
>>>>>>>> + if (refcount_read(&current_prog_set->usage) != 1)
>>>>>>>> + pages += round_up(sizeof(*current_prog_set), PAGE_SIZE)
>>>>>>>> + / PAGE_SIZE;
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> + if (pages > LANDLOCK_PROGRAMS_MAX_PAGES)
>>>>>>>> + return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG);
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + /* ensure early that we can allocate enough memory for the new
>>>>>>>> + * prog_lists */
>>>>>>>> + err = store_landlock_prog(&tmp_prog_set, current_prog_set, prog);
>>>>>>>> + if (err)
>>>>>>>> + return ERR_PTR(err);
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>>>> + * Each task_struct points to an array of prog list pointers. These
>>>>>>>> + * tables are duplicated when additions are made (which means each
>>>>>>>> + * table needs to be refcounted for the processes using it). When a new
>>>>>>>> + * table is created, all the refcounters on the prog_list are bumped (to
>>>>>>>> + * track each table that references the prog). When a new prog is
>>>>>>>> + * added, it's just prepended to the list for the new table to point
>>>>>>>> + * at.
>>>>>>>> + *
>>>>>>>> + * Manage all the possible errors before this step to not uselessly
>>>>>>>> + * duplicate current_prog_set and avoid a rollback.
>>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>>> + if (!new_prog_set) {
>>>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>>>> + * If there is no Landlock program set used by the current task,
>>>>>>>> + * then create a new one.
>>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>>> + new_prog_set = new_landlock_prog_set();
>>>>>>>> + if (IS_ERR(new_prog_set))
>>>>>>>> + goto put_tmp_lists;
>>>>>>>> + } else if (refcount_read(&current_prog_set->usage) > 1) {
>>>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>>>> + * If the current task is not the sole user of its Landlock
>>>>>>>> + * program set, then duplicate them.
>>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>>> + new_prog_set = new_landlock_prog_set();
>>>>>>>> + if (IS_ERR(new_prog_set))
>>>>>>>> + goto put_tmp_lists;
>>>>>>>> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(new_prog_set->programs); i++) {
>>>>>>>> + new_prog_set->programs[i] =
>>>>>>>> + READ_ONCE(current_prog_set->programs[i]);
>>>>>>>> + if (new_prog_set->programs[i])
>>>>>>>> + refcount_inc(&new_prog_set->programs[i]->usage);
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>>>> + * Landlock program set from the current task will not be freed
>>>>>>>> + * here because the usage is strictly greater than 1. It is
>>>>>>>> + * only prevented to be freed by another task thanks to the
>>>>>>>> + * caller of landlock_prepend_prog() which should be locked if
>>>>>>>> + * needed.
>>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>>> + landlock_put_prog_set(current_prog_set);
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + /* prepend tmp_prog_set to new_prog_set */
>>>>>>>> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tmp_prog_set.programs); i++) {
>>>>>>>> + /* get the last new list */
>>>>>>>> + struct landlock_prog_list *last_list =
>>>>>>>> + tmp_prog_set.programs[i];
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> + if (last_list) {
>>>>>>>> + while (last_list->prev)
>>>>>>>> + last_list = last_list->prev;
>>>>>>>> + /* no need to increment usage (pointer replacement) */
>>>>>>>> + last_list->prev = new_prog_set->programs[i];
>>>>>>>> + new_prog_set->programs[i] = tmp_prog_set.programs[i];
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>>> + new_prog_set->chain_last = tmp_prog_set.chain_last;
>>>>>>>> + return new_prog_set;
>>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>>> +put_tmp_lists:
>>>>>>>> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tmp_prog_set.programs); i++)
>>>>>>>> + put_landlock_prog_list(tmp_prog_set.programs[i]);
>>>>>>>> + return new_prog_set;
>>>>>>>> +}
>>>>>>> Nack on the chaining concept.
>>>>>>> Please do not reinvent the wheel.
>>>>>>> There is an existing mechanism for attaching/detaching/quering multiple
>>>>>>> programs attached to cgroup and tracing hooks that are also
>>>>>>> efficiently executed via BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY.
>>>>>>> Please use that instead.
>>>>>> I don't see how that would help. Suppose you add a filter, then
>>>>>> fork(), and then the child adds another filter. Do you want to
>>>>>> duplicate the entire array? You certainly can't *modify* the array
>>>>>> because you'll affect processes that shouldn't be affected.
>>>>>> In contrast, doing this through seccomp like the earlier patches
>>>>>> seemed just fine to me, and seccomp already had the right logic.
>>>>> it doesn't look to me that existing seccomp side of managing fork
>>>>> situation can be reused. Here there is an attempt to add 'chaining'
>>>>> concept which sort of an extension of existing seccomp style,
>>>>> but somehow heavily done on bpf side and contradicts cgroup/tracing.
>>>> I don't see why the seccomp way can't be used. I agree with you that
>>>> the seccomp *style* shouldn't be used in bpf code like this, but I
>>>> think that Landlock programs can and should just live in the existing
>>>> seccomp chain. If the existing seccomp code needs some modification
>>>> to make this work, then so be it.
>>> +1
>>> if that was the case...
>>> but that's not my reading of the patch set.
>> An earlier version of the patch set used the seccomp filter chain.
>> Mickaël, what exactly was wrong with that approach other than that the
>> seccomp() syscall was awkward for you to use? You could add a
>> seccomp_add_landlock_rule() syscall if you needed to.
> Nothing was wrong about about that, this part did not changed (see my
> next comment).
>> As a side comment, why is this an LSM at all, let alone a non-stacking
>> LSM? It would make a lot more sense to me to make Landlock depend on
>> having LSMs configured in but to call the landlock hooks directly from
>> the security_xyz() hooks.
> See Casey's answer and his patch series:
>>>> In other words, the kernel already has two kinds of chaining:
>>>> seccomp's and bpf's. bpf's doesn't work right for this type of usage
>>>> across fork(), whereas seccomp's already handles that case correctly.
>>>> (In contrast, seccomp's is totally wrong for cgroup-attached filters.)
>>>> So IMO Landlock should use the seccomp core code and call into bpf
>>>> for the actual filtering.
>>> +1
>>> in cgroup we had to invent this new BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY mechanism,
>>> since cgroup hierarchy can be complicated with bpf progs attached
>>> at different levels with different override/multiprog properties,
>>> so walking link list and checking all flags at run-time would have
>>> been too slow. That's why we added compute_effective_progs().
>> If we start adding override flags to Landlock, I think we're doing it
>> wrong. With cgroup bpf programs, the whole mess is set up by the
>> administrator. With seccomp, and with Landlock if done correctly, it
>> *won't* be set up by the administrator, so the chance that everyone
>> gets all the flags right is about zero. All attached filters should
>> run unconditionally.
> There is a misunderstanding about this chaining mechanism. This should
> not be confused with the list of seccomp filters nor the cgroup
> hierarchies. Landlock programs can be stacked the same way seccomp's
> filters can (cf. struct landlock_prog_set, the "chain_last" field is an
> optimization which is not used for this struct handling). This stackable
> property did not changed from the previous patch series. The chaining
> mechanism is for another use case, which does not make sense for seccomp
> filters nor other eBPF program types, at least for now, from what I can
> tell.
> You may want to get a look at my talk at FOSDEM
> (, especially
> slides 11 and 12.
> Let me explain my reasoning about this program chaining thing.
> To check if an action on a file is allowed, we first need to identify
> this file and match it to the security policy. In a previous
> (non-public) patch series, I tried to use one type of eBPF program to
> check every kind of access to a file. To be able to identify a file, I
> relied on an eBPF map, similar to the current inode map. This map store
> a set of references to file descriptors. I then created a function
> bpf_is_file_beneath() to check if the requested file was beneath a file
> in the map. This way, no chaining, only one eBPF program type to check
> an access to a file... but some issues then emerged. First, this design
> create a side-channel which help an attacker using such a program to
> infer some information not normally available, for example to get a hint
> on where a file descriptor (received from a UNIX socket) come from.
> Another issue is that this type of program would be called for each
> component of a path. Indeed, when the kernel check if an access to a
> file is allowed, it walk through all of the directories in its path
> (checking if the current process is allowed to execute them). That first
> attempt led me to rethink the way we could filter an access to a file
> *path*.
> To minimize the number of called to an eBPF program dedicated to
> validate an access to a file path, I decided to create three subtype of
> eBPF programs. The FS_WALK type is called when walking through every
> directory of a file path (except the last one if it is the target). We
> can then restrict this type of program to the minimum set of functions
> it is allowed to call and the minimum set of data available from its
> context. The first implicit chaining is for this type of program. To be
> able to evaluate a path while being called for all its components, this
> program need to store a state (to remember what was the parent directory
> of this path). There is no "previous" field in the subtype for this
> program because it is chained with itself, for each directories. This
> enable to create a FS_WALK program to evaluate a file hierarchy, thank
> to the inode map which can be used to check if a directory of this
> hierarchy is part of an allowed (or denied) list of directories. This
> design enables to express a file hierarchy in a programmatic way,
> without requiring an eBPF helper to do the job (unlike my first experiment).
> The explicit chaining is used to tied a path evaluation (with a FS_WALK
> program) to an access to the actual file being requested (the last
> component of a file path), with a FS_PICK program. It is only at this
> time that the kernel check for the requested action (e.g. read, write,
> chdir, append...). To be able to filter such access request we can have
> one call to the same program for every action and let this program check
> for which action it was called. However, this design does not allow the
> kernel to know if the current action is indeed handled by this program.
> Hence, it is not possible to implement a cache mechanism to only call
> this program if it knows how to handle this action.
> The approach I took for this FS_PICK type of program is to add to its
> subtype which action it can handle (with the "triggers" bitfield, seen
> as ORed actions). This way, the kernel knows if a call to a FS_PICK
> program is necessary. If the user wants to enforce a different security
> policy according to the action requested on a file, then it needs
> multiple FS_PICK programs. However, to reduce the number of such
> programs, this patch series allow a FS_PICK program to be chained with
> another, the same way a FS_WALK is chained with itself. This way, if the
> user want to check if the action is a for example an "open" and a "read"
> and not a "map" and a "read", then it can chain multiple FS_PICK
> programs with different triggers actions. The OR check performed by the
> kernel is not a limitation then, only a way to know if a call to an eBPF
> program is needed.
> The last type of program is FS_GET. This one is called when a process
> get a struct file or change its working directory. This is the only
> program type able (and allowed) to tag a file. This restriction is
> important to not being subject to resource exhaustion attacks (i.e.
> tagging every inode accessible to an attacker, which would allocate too
> much kernel memory).
> This design gives room for improvements to create a cache of eBPF
> context (input data, including maps if any), with the result of an eBPF
> program. This would help limit the number of call to an eBPF program the
> same way SELinux or other kernel components do to limit costly checks.
> The eBPF maps of progs are useful to call the same type of eBPF
> program. It does not fit with this use case because we may want multiple
> eBPF program according to the action requested on a kernel object (e.g.
> FS_GET). The other reason is because the eBPF program does not know what
> will be the next (type of) access check performed by the kernel.
> To say it another way, this chaining mechanism is a way to split a
> kernel object evaluation with multiple specialized programs, each of
> them being able to deal with data tied to their type. Using a monolithic
> eBPF program to check everything does not scale and does not fit with
> unprivileged use either.
> As a side note, the cookie value is only an ephemeral value to keep a
> state between multiple programs call. It can be used to create a state
> machine for an object evaluation.
> I don't see a way to do an efficient and programmatic path evaluation,
> with different access checks, with the current eBPF features. Please let
> me know if you know how to do it another way.

Andy, Alexei, Daniel, what do you think about this Landlock program
chaining and cookie?

[unhandled content-type:application/pgp-signature]
 \ /
  Last update: 2018-04-08 15:15    [W:0.153 / U:6.212 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site