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SubjectRe: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot

> > What I'm afraid of is this turning into a "security" feature that ends up
> > being circumvented in most scenarios where it's currently deployed - eg,
> > module signatures are mostly worthless in the non-lockdown case because you
> > can just grab the sig_enforce symbol address and then kexec a preamble that
> > flips it back to N regardless of the kernel config.
> Whoa. Why doesn't lockdown prevent kexec? Put another away, why
> isn't this a problem for people who are fearful that Linux could be
> used as part of a Windows boot virus in a Secure UEFI context?
> If lockdown simply included a requirement for a signed kernel for
> kexec --- and if kernel signing aren't available, to simply not alow
> kexec, wouldn't that take care of this case?
> This wouldn't even be all that much of a burden for non-distro users
> with lockdown enabled, since in my experience outside of enterprise
> and data center use cases, kexec isn't used --- and in fact, very
> often kexec doesn't even work outside of a very carefully selected and
> bug-fixed set of device drivers. (It often doesn't work in non-distro
> kernels because very few upstream developers really care about kexec.)

I do have Motorola Droid 4 here (cellphone). It uses safestrap.. and
than it turn kexec's a lot (so that you can select Android vs. Jolla
vs. ... during boot).

So yes, kexec shows even in unexpected places.

And BTW.. the cellphone thingie is a situation where manufacturer
works against it users. Motorola does _not_ want me to run my own
kernels here.

(cesky, pictures)
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