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SubjectRe: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> writes:

> Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
>
>> As far as I can tell, what's really going on here is that there's a
>> significant contingent here that wants to prevent Linux from
>> chainloading something that isn't Linux.
>
> You have completely the wrong end of the stick. No one has said that or even
> implied that. You are alleging dishonesty on our part.
>
> What we *have* said is that *if* we want to pass the secure boot state across
> kexec, then we have to make sure that:
>
> (1) no one tampers with the intermediate kernel between boot and kexec
> otherwise the secure boot state is effectively invalidated, and
>
> (2) the image that gets kexec'ed is trusted.
>
> Remember: you cannot know (2) if you don't have (1).
>
> And if someone tampers with the aim of breaking, say, Windows, then someone,
> e.g. Microsoft, might blacklist the shim.

*Wow* You just denied this isn't about not booting Windows and a few
lines later said that is your concern.

I was thinking I would have to dig up old archives where I had been told
this before, but you just nicely repeated all of the old arguments so I
don't see the point.

Eric

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