lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2018]   [Apr]   [30]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: Linux messages full of `random: get_random_u32 called from`
On Sun, Apr 29, 2018 at 08:11:07PM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
>
> What your patch does is assume that there is a full bit of uncertainty
> that can be obtained from the information gathered from each
> interrupt. I *might* be willing to assume that to be valid on x86
> systems that have a high resolution cycle counter. But on ARM
> platforms, especially during system bootup when the user isn't typing
> anything and SSD's and flash storage tend to have very predictable
> timing patterns? Not a bet I'd be willing to take. Even with a cycle
> counter, there's a reason why we assumed that we need to mix in timing
> results from 64 interrupts or one second's worth before we would give
> a single bit's worth of entropy credit.
>
> - Ted

What about abusing high-resolution timers to get entropy? Since hrtimers can't
make guarantees down to the nanosecond, there's always a skew between the
requested expiry time and the actual expiry time.

Please see the attached patch and let me know just how horrible it is.

Sultan

From b0d21c38558c661531d4cb46816fbb36b874a169 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sultan Alsawaf <sultanxda@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Apr 2018 21:28:08 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] random: use high-res timers to generate entropy until crng
init is done

---
drivers/char/random.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 47 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index d9e38523b383..af2d60bbcec3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -286,6 +286,7 @@
#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
#define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512
#define EXTRACT_SIZE 10
+#define ENTROPY_GEN_INTVL_NS (1 * NSEC_PER_MSEC)


#define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long))
@@ -408,6 +409,8 @@ static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);

+static struct hrtimer entropy_gen_hrtimer;
+
struct crng_state {
__u32 state[16];
unsigned long init_time;
@@ -2287,3 +2290,47 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
+
+/*
+ * Generate entropy on init using high-res timers. Although high-res timers
+ * provide nanosecond precision, they don't actually honor requests to the
+ * nanosecond. The skew between the expected time difference in nanoseconds and
+ * the actual time difference can be used as a way to generate entropy on boot
+ * for machines that lack sufficient boot-time entropy.
+ */
+static enum hrtimer_restart entropy_timer_cb(struct hrtimer *timer)
+{
+ static u64 prev_ns;
+ u64 curr_ns, delta;
+
+ if (crng_ready())
+ return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
+
+ curr_ns = ktime_get_mono_fast_ns();
+ delta = curr_ns - prev_ns;
+
+ add_interrupt_randomness(delta);
+
+ /* Use the hrtimer skew to make the next interval more unpredictable */
+ if (likely(prev_ns))
+ hrtimer_add_expires_ns(timer, delta);
+ else
+ hrtimer_add_expires_ns(timer, ENTROPY_GEN_INTVL_NS);
+
+ prev_ns = curr_ns;
+ return HRTIMER_RESTART;
+}
+
+static int entropy_gen_hrtimer_init(void)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS))
+ return 0;
+
+ hrtimer_init(&entropy_gen_hrtimer, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
+
+ entropy_gen_hrtimer.function = entropy_timer_cb;
+ hrtimer_start(&entropy_gen_hrtimer, ns_to_ktime(ENTROPY_GEN_INTVL_NS),
+ HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
+ return 0;
+}
+core_initcall(entropy_gen_hrtimer_init);
--
2.14.1
\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2018-04-30 06:35    [W:0.126 / U:5.912 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site